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THE MYTHS OF THE ACTORS OF THE CONSCIENTIOUS WARS

The article examines an increasingly popular thesis about the conscientious essence of modern warfare. The creators and supporters of this concept talk about wars to defeat (destroy) consciousness. As a distinctive characteristic, they point to the contradictory nature of these conflicts – that in them there is a confrontation between one and all. In the course of the study, it turns out that the interpretation of these wars as having no specific enemy (no enemy) does indeed have a right to exist, but only not concerning modernity, but to World history.

Besides, the thesis that modern war is a «war of consciousness» inevitably leads science to the problems of methodology in understanding the phenomenon of consciousness.

Keywords: consciential war, modern warfare, «war of consciousness», phenomenon of consciousness, national consciousness, actors of the conscientious threat.

Problem setting. The creators and supporters of the conscientious essence of modern warfare talk about wars to defeat (destroy) consciousness. This study shows that the actors of the concept of modern conscientious wars reproduce a completely forgotten interpretation of it as a tabula rasa – a blank slate, which inevitably distorts the understanding of the real state of affairs (in the history of philosophy it has already been overcome for two hundred years). At the same time, the methodology developed by German classical philosophy, which reached its completion in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, allows to reveal the true essence of both modern and historically traversed forms of national consciousness.

Voluntarily or involuntarily, but being not as much psychologists or sociologists as political strategists, the supporters of this concept mythologize the nature of both consciousness in general and its national form in particular. The purpose of this article – to reduce the degree of social tension generated by such myths.

Recent research and publications analysis. The results of the analysis of scientific sources and publications indicate that these conditions require a thorough and in-depth study of the conscious essence of modern war. A number of works are devoted to the study, taking into account world theoretical experience and Western legal concepts, which is reflected, in particular, in the works of: G. Deleuze, F. Guattari [8], H. Fulda, D. Henrich [9], D. Lukacs[19], O. Pöggeler [21], S. Zhabotynska [24]. The methodology developed by German classical philosophy, which culminated in Hegel's Phenomenology of the Spirit, allows us to reveal the true essence of both modern and historically passed forms of national consciousness.

Paper objective. Explanation of the contradictory facts of the surrounding reality is the most important task of any science [6]. Such phenomena sometimes take the form of paradoxes. They have been of particular interest to science since ancient times [5]. One of them, which, we hope, will hardly leave any of our contemporaries indifferent, will be discussed here.

How is it possible for the attacking side to exist and the defender to be absent? What will become, for example, with the book of I Ching: The Chinese Book of Changes if someone, just for fun, leaves information about Yin, erases all mention about Yang? In M. Bulgakov's novel, Woland quite rightly asks that what would your good be doing if there were no evil, and what would the earth look like if shadows disappeared from it [3]? After all, opposites are opposites that cannot go without each other. Moreover, the military budgets of world leaders stubbornly do not want to decrease.

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Paper main body. What kind of war is this, when the actors, the acting subjects of it, actively arming themselves, spending most of their budgets on this, while the objects, on whose "head" all this power could have been brought down, either absent altogether or remain undefined?

Finally, it is recognized that the people"s "body", its geographical, economic, ethnic, cultural, and other forms of existence, have another important factor – national consciousness. If we take into account that it was the consciousness that was the sights of all representatives of modern European philosophy, we'll see analytical departments of modern states. For example, Rand Corporation John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt. We will have to turn to this particular period of the history of philosophy for empirical understanding. These analysts will be faced with the problem of taking into account all the pros and cons of this philosophy.

Actors of the conscientious threat (or protection from it) will sooner or later face the problem of classifying these very forms of national consciousness. But, a division into species is the most complicated scientific procedure! Here the question of the criterion becomes necessary. And again they will begin to remember the classification of the forms of the mind by Locke or Kant, the self-consciousness of Fichte, or the consciousness of Hegel or Husserl.

In practical terms, the meaning of the phrase 'conscientious war' allows one to explain "strange" facts from everyday reality. The real confrontation between powers is moving into cyberspace, and the "arms race" is moving there [3].

Finally, the most important problem faced by the actors of these wars is the method problem. It is natural that even having set a purely practical task for oneself—to "hit" the consciousness of the enemy that has been found, it is necessary to compile more or less accurate knowledge about the subject. For this, it is necessary to determine firstly with your consciousness. What position toward the investigated conscious should consciousness of the researcher take for the former to reveal its nature to the latter? In this case, it is impossible to ignore such a duality of consciousness both from the side of the content and from the side of the form (consciousness explores consciousness)!

Let us take a closer look at the thesis (there are no obvious opponents in conscientious wars and cannot be!).

Unfortunately, regarding its second part, the authors of this thesis are trying to pretend that they are only stating an obvious fact. Nevertheless, there are questions for him. Otherwise, one gets the impression that the military influence

in modern states is still so strong that the "generals" are simply pulling state budgets from the "social sphere" onto themselves.

The content of the famous work of Astolphe de Custine [4] indicates that any system of law and order has a universal character. The inertia of each state pushes it to expand. Almost every state is a heavy machine that seems useless outside of the ultimate goal.

Here it deals with the perspective of the world. Still, the downside of this claim says, more rather of the "prospect of war", but not just a random one, but a world one! To be more precise in the wording, should pay attention to the fact that an ordinary state, naturally striving to become a regional, then continental, and finally a world leader, does not "think" at all about the specifics of the path (or means) on which it will achieve its goal. Let us clarify this idea using well-known examples, which only seem to be talking about something else.

Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law – Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative. And very close to the previously quoted passage is Eugène Ionesco's paradoxical remark that only the individual who is unlike anyone else can seriously expect everyone to identify with him. Doesn't Martin Luther King mean something else when he states injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly [18].

What is this: meaninglessness or a clear sign of the most complex content of the phenomenon of consciousness, "overflowing" with opposite meanings?

When Kant, aiming to reveal the essence of science, also raised the question of the nature of consciousness (or, as it was called in the tradition of modern European philosophy – mind), it turned out that without the "strange" ones he called "a priori synthetic judgments", the activity of any science turns out to be complete nonsense or tautology.

"Straight-line is the shortest distance between two points", "7 + 5 = 12", "when converting one substance into another, the amount of energy is constant" are examples of judgments used by the "founder father" of German classical philosophy. Understandably, such formulations from sensory experience cannot be proved or refuted. But not only. The greatest paradox was in direct violation of the law of formal logic – about the incompatibility of the opposite. The phrase "a priori synthesis" in the first part means the *universally*, and in the second – "the combination of what *seems* to be incompatible." Except the latter is what reveals itself as *special*.

Kant highlights (and more than once) that only *a similar* phenomenon gives "different", "new" knowledge [17, p. 38]. This knowledge will become a guiding thread for any scientist trying to understand the hidden meanings of the worldwide

history of humankind. And after will become a condition for any dissertation, scientific article, report, or speech.

The Greeks, having discovered in their language the concept of Aletheia (truth), which was already filled not only with ontological but also with epistemological meaning (as the unity of the opposites of thinking and being), immediately began their history with a campaign against the Asian city of Troy. And they ended this story with the same attack on the East (campaigns led by Alexander). At the same time, when Alexander himself married and married his soldiers to Persians (a wedding in Susa), no one had any fears that the "night cuckoos" would change the consciousness of their husbands ("recast mind"). Truth is the identity of words and things, thinking and being! This is the a priori synthetic judgment from which the whole European history began. The fact that at the epicenter of this movement of the Greeks to the East is Parmenides' thesis: "thought and being are the same seems incredible, but it is!".

The Romans were calm in the sense of a consensual conflict by famous edict Constitutio Antoniniana promulgated by Caracalla in AD 212, granting citizenship to all or almost all the free inhabitants of the empire. Why? Because they were driven by their own "Pan-Idea" the phenomenon of legal consciousness. But after all, even Aristotle, for the first time carefully analyzing "reasonable justice (δικαστική φρόνησις) and distinguishing it from "techne", spoke of art when the subject (histrionis), proceeding from a specific situation (peculiari), brings it under the universal (lex). At the same time, a legal entity has no right to wish for anything other than justice itself [2, p. 183]. That's an example of yet another a priori synthesis that gave the creators of the Eternal City the fame of a world-historical people. And legions, emperors, senate, triumphs, etc. – this is all just an external design.

It is unlikely that the elders, deacons, and bishops who met in June 325 in the city of Nicaea thought about the consequences of identifying the Son as consubstantial (ὁμοούσιος) to the Father. And yet they gave it! The historians will look for the special source raising the prime cause of Western peoples' movement to the east (crusades). It is possible to explain the actions of people by the serpent's motivation as if they completely forget about the divine, intended to be content, like a worm, with dust and water [11, p. 11]. Explanation through reason: struggle for living space. What will it give except for endless lament: everything's the same everywhere, there is nothing new under the moon!

We are emotionally warned that this is a catastrophe! Modern war is special, the one – against all mankind! We draw attention to the fact that within the framework of classical phenomenology, each form of consciousness is "alone" and knows itself and only for itself in its system of authenticity.

The forms of world national identity behave in close the same way. Hector – the prince of Troy, before the fight with Achilles, suggests that he should bury the loser with dignity. Troy is a city that does not differ much from the Pan-idea from the Greeks who storm it (as evidenced by the very existence of a temple dedicated to Apollo, plundered by the Achilles soldiers). To which the son of Thetis, as they say, looking at him point-blank, and at the same time not seeing him ideologically at all, replied that he was hated forever, leave the terms! How unbreakable vows are possible between lions and people. There is never an agreement between wolves and lambs [13].

And here, as above, we are dealing with a natural expansion of culture within. That is a thesis that the conscientious war is aimed "at all of humanity" is an excellent illustration, but not the modern, but the historical state of affairs.

The modern war is waging, but not at the level of consciousness (the most complex formations of the spirit). It holds at a level just below consciousness. Finally, it has to admit. That it is not consensual, but a subconscious (subliminal level) war.

That is the thesis that there are no obvious opponents in conscientious wars and cannot be! in essence correct. Two and a half thousand years ago, it was with the Greeks and precisely with the appearance of the phenomenon of consciousness (in the sense of realizing the absolute identity of non-identical thinking and being) that the true history of humanity began. It is very significant that in addition to the word Aletheia – truth its double was born the word 'history' appeared among the Greeks. So Thucydides (400 BC) opposes it as a science to the 'storytelling' of logographers and defines the goal – the search for truth [22]. Moreover, somewhere at the same time, the word "philosophy" appears. The "trinity" was born, which determined the fate of the phenomenon of consciousness in all subsequent history.

Just as individual consciousness, the national can be affected economically, geographically, politically, and even physically. The peoples were once the hegemons of the world can disappear from the surface of the Earth altogether. That is, the 'shell' can experience all the vicissitudes of fate. But its essence will remain unaffected until national consciousness goes through the experience of transforming itself. It is a conclusion that follows from an understanding of the very nature of the opposition of one national consciousness to another. World history is filled with conscientious wars of "one" nation with all. But to attribute this unique paradox to an exclusively modern form of military interaction is wishful thinking.

In the case of the concept of "wars of consciousness", we are dealing with the assertion that its actors are acting subjects (governments expressing the will of their peoples; analysts representing various groups within the state and the authors themselves or supporters of the concept of these wars) are purposefully engaged (the

meaning of the concept of 'engaged' is broad) in the consciousness of the alleged adversary. For such an occupation, it is necessary to have at least some idea of this consciousness, at least some knowledge. It is worth remembering the difference between the work of the bee and the architect according to Karl Marx [20], which, however, is the essence of a paraphrase of Hegel's remark: the felonious thought of a criminal is greater and more sublime than all the wonders of the world [19].

Where will they get this knowledge? It is natural to assume – from what they know about their consciousness.

Modern Hegelian studies focused on the problem of the difference between the methods of the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Science of Logic, and they usually begin with an analysis of the secondary consciousness, consciousness as an object [21]. This context proposes captivating ideas regarding the actual structure of the elements of the Hegelian system, including those that run counter to Hegel's views about his system [9]. One gets the impression that these questions are very far from the purely applied problems of the concept of conscientious wars. We will refute this later.

Here, most often, attention is focused on either one or two points (abilities) of natural consciousness. Even the author of "Phenomenology" in the introduction begins his characterization with the ability to deliver a "fatal blow" to any subject of his knowledge, cutting it into two parts: what it seems to be, and what it is (phenomenon and noumenon). Consciousness distinguishes from itself something with which it at the same time correlates; or, as they say, it is something for consciousness [11]. It is significant – the second moment of consciousness. Anticipating further research, let us ask the question: is there a reason that when the actor of the consensual influence begins to consider the supposed consequences of his distinction between the subject of this influence, then first he will certainly feel confident in the effectiveness of such an action (and disappointment will come only later)?

Then there is a consciousness experience (as Hegel calls it) when the indicated two sides of the object are correlated (phenomenon and essence, appearance and reality). Consciousness longs to find the truth. In turn, for sure leads him to the fact that it begins to understand that what is considered to exist by itself if it exists, then only for him. And he has nowhere to go except to change his knowledge, with the change of which a new object arises, and with it, a new form of consciousness. As it will become clear later, it's the most important – the third moment of consciousness. It will become the basis for the subsequent phenomenological and historical difference between the forms of consciousness (including the global opposition: the modern and historical types of consciousness).

According to Hegel, it turns out there is no "scattering" of diverse forms of consciousness primordially. They are 'pearls' permeated by one thread, one

destiny. It's the same consciousness at different stages of development. That is, fighting with its object, each form of consciousness is fighting with itself. I am here and not here, I am everywhere and nowhere. And I swear to myself that you will lose the fight. Not a fake Rustam? (referred to in the famous Persian epic Shahnameh). I swear by myself that you will lose the fight. Not a spurious Rustam. The true Rustam will amaze himself in a bloody battle [23]. There is a fear that the fate of the actors of the conscientious wars will be as this eastern hero awaits. Likewise, the character called "The Writer" from A. Tarkovsky's 'Stalker' admits: After all, I thought to remake them 'my readers', but they remade me! In its image and likeness [10].

Nevertheless, here Hegel captures the second and third moments of consciousness. Where is the first one? What is its essence? Where does the experience of consciousness begin?

A little higher, in the preface, he formulated this point quite definitely. The individual (another name of the object investigated in the "Phenomenology") is Absolute form, that is, the immediate reliability of himself and he is that Unconditional being [11, p. 19]. Let us pay attention to the epithets that Hegel generously endows consciousness with: 'absolute form and unconditional being.' After all, these are the characteristics of the Creator Himself! Moreover, if in the first-moment consciousness behaves like a free entity, then this freedom (divinity) automatically extends to the second (separation) and third (truth) moments discussed above.

And this means the consciousness of the creators of the concept of "consciousness wars" has stopped its attention on the people's spirituality (their country, their culture, etcetera) despite all billions of objects of the universe. Further, it separated the "visible from the present", proposing the idea that in modern times not his physical, economic, or political "body", but his consciousness genuine danger exposed. And finally, publishing one research after another checks the objectivity of this thesis at the moment of truth and itself leaves one system of reliability and creates a new one. The main idea of Hegel's Phenomenology formulated paradoxically: consciousness, unconsciously for itself, makes the experience of ascent from one of its forms to another.

Naturally, the question arises: what does this consciousness think of itself? But before answering it, let's take a closer look at the second participant in phenomenological action – the consciousness of the phenomenologist, science, or what Hegel marks with the pronouns "wir", "für uns".

It is clear that this consciousness also bears the burden of all three "freedoms" of its subject. Nobody forced the philosophy of modern times to deal exclusively with the nature of knowledge. It's just that her own need for her history from the cognition of the world (antiquity) and God (scholasticism), sooner or later, had

to lead science to this question. It is a consequence of the first moment – the totality of the historical and philosophical process. But the second point requires a separation in the subject. And if these are not mountains, rivers, valleys, etcetera but consciousness itself, what about it? Solved this question, we get the key to understanding German classical philosophy, also historical events associated with political ideologies.

The fact is that here philosophy was compelled to introduce division into the consciousness itself investigated by it. Must admit that one thing is what we know about it, another, what It knows about himself. It is sovereign, and It is absolute in all its three moments. The question arises: is It for itself or others?

The very nature of consciousness is determined by what it considers as truth in its knowledge. The German construction in this sense indicates the essence more accurately than the Russian or Latin. E. Husserl has this in mind, shifting the reader's attention to the second part of the German Bewusstsein, to "sein" – being [14]. Philosophical consciousness in phenomenology is engaged ordinary consciousness. It sees in it the same thing as in itself – selfhood. Only the latter is carried away by its subject and by what it considers to be true in it. If it is sensory data, then it is sensory consciousness. Whereas the mind sees "the other side" of sensations as the genuine play of forces. If it transfers this "true" into itself, it is self-consciousness, and so on.

One-sided recognition on the part of the ordinary philosophical consciousness makes it possible to assert that both are the same consciousness. Meanwhile, a completely different understanding of oneself and reality from the side of everyday consciousness gives a moment of opposition. At this point, Hegel reproduces the a priori synthesis of self-consciousness discovered by Kant, and this synthesis, in turn, involves both consciousnesses in a movement that he calls 'experience.' It is thanks to him that the ladder of the fundamental forms of consciousness arises. It is impossible by concept to "strike", "destroy", "clear" and even make minimal "changes" from the outside to each of these forms! By the way, we note that to our regret, the idea that "Phenomenology" is at the same time a ladder of methodologies for studying reality, because each form has its representation of this reality, has not yet become the center of nowadays philosophical discussions.

Here we are approaching the main problem of this study to the issue of what kind of methodological position did the authors of the phrase "conscientious war" take?

Referring to the images of the "arrow" (E. Husserl), "stream" (W. James), "mirror" (G. Shchedrovitsky), we can talk about the main characteristic of consciousness is that consciousness in general empty, that the mechanisms of consciousness cannot strap to some morphological elements ... it is a stream that acquires the characteristics of the landscape through which it flows. What follows

from this inevitably? The conclusion suggests itself. All of this is a mainly forgotten concept of thinking as a tabula rasa.

At first glance, it seems that D. Locke opposes this paradigm of interpretation of consciousness (tabula rasa) to the paradigm of innate ideas of R. Descartes. Should not forget, Descartes himself, the author of "The Origin of Philosophy" (1644), defines the first foundation of any science not through "cogito ergo sum", but through "de omnibus dubitandum", then it becomes clear that the methodological position of understanding thinking as pure boards in both directions of Modern philosophy are identical.

Kant is not entirely correct in ascribing to himself the novelty of the task of studying a priori synthetic judgments. From the very beginning, modern European philosophy tried to understand their "origin" in our minds. These are the laws of science that Descartes called distinct, clear ideas (Latin ideae innatae), and Bacon called the opening axioms. Turning to this "unsuccessful" experience in the study of consciousness (after all, it ended in agnosticism) is now necessary for three reasons:

firstly, if it were not for it, German classical philosophy would not have been able to find a new solution to the problem, without the results of which the understanding of the phenomenon of modern wars (sub conscientious wars) would be impossible;

secondly, modern newest projects on the indicated problems ignore the work already done by history. Interdisciplinary project "Awareness of Consciousness" aims both scientific and educational objectives and can be performed by Fulbright programs' participants – representative of various theoretical and practical fields [24];

thirdly, current actors of conscientious wars, formulating the "defeat" of the enemy's consciousness as the main task, share the fundamental error of the position of both rationalists and empiricists. Then it was a methodologically necessary experience with a negative result, but now it is becoming a myth, in which they believe and require budget funding for its implementation.

The image of a mankurt – a man with an "erased" memory, migrated from the novels of Ch. Aitmatov [1, p. 200] into the minds of the actors of the conscientious wars seems very convincing. Only Kant, with a more careful study of the ability of cognition, was able to find something else. The very title of his main work, published in Riga in 1781, already speaks volumes. Nitially, the word "criticism" did not contain a negation (from the Greek "κριτική" – to distinguish, judge, evaluate). Moreover, he argues that criticism and criterion are etymologically clearly similar terms. Nevertheless, Kant has a pronounced negation here. He criticizes the idea (myth) of the mind-consciousness as a blank slate, as a passive matter, susceptible to any external influence. In the middle of his first "Critique", he is

forced to conclude the transcendental unity of apperception, as a property of our consciousness everywhere and in everything to be ourselves [17, p. 100]. Kant set this union as the foundation of both theoretical and practical, just like aesthetic and religious reason. True, then this formulation goes "sideways" for the system of Kant's transcendental philosophy. I. Fichte blamed the philosophy of his teacher for the lack of consistency. His question sounded simple: with the help of what form of cognition Kant if we use modern language, "neutralized" the consensual conflict of these forms: committed the experience of their research? What is its feature that most likely plays the role of true universality?

We believe that Hegel gave the utter answer to these questions. Here he began intellectually rapidly outstripping his friend F. Schelling, which allowed him by 1807 to create a method of phenomenology that unites the incompatible – two forms of consciousness: the phenomenologist and the individual, which "start" from different and at the same time the same understanding of themselves. And the expression "I saw The World Spirit on horseback" expressed by Hegel to Napoleon (during his triumphant entry into Jena, after the defeat of the Prussian troops), is filled with burning irony. Reason (the World Spirit or the Universal Form of Cognition), if it dwells somewhere, then just not "on a horse". His Absolute kingdom found within the meanings that fill the manuscripts (revisions of the first edition of Phenomenology), which the philosopher shoved into his pockets then, in October 1806, fleeing from French soldiers, or, we hope, between us who are writing these lines and those who read them, more precisely, wherever philosophy meets reality.

Consequently that consciousness itself is nothing it is absolute non-being; no content of its own, no form of its own. Its definition is zero. It is incapable say about it that it simply Is. Since if you say it – you will deal not with nothing, but with Being. (Parmenides).

It remains only to note that even marine organisms in ocean depressions, withstanding colossal pressure, lack of light, food, etcetera, preserve themselves – their genetic nature and reproduce it in descendants (recall the example given by Aristotle, what if the copper ax held its shape, it would be alive) [2]. Like a lion, having feasted on an antelope, if it had not "given" its certainty, then it would have simply died from ... indigestion.

The option that, perhaps, the situation is the other way around. That consciousness, flowing through the landscape of the universe, "automatically" transforms it, endows, as Kant would say, with its a priori synthesis. But the authors of the idea of consciousness wars do not even consider this! Here we can only emphasize that the phenomenon of consciousness in the hierarchy of world forms among the supporters of this concept (tabula rasa) has a place below the most primitive organisms.

The stage of rationalism and empiricism was necessary for the history of philosophy for the subsequent overcoming. Now the concept of consciousness as a blank slate is needed by modern political strategists. Since Karl Marx's Theses on Feuerbach (Spring 1845), these ideologists have taken a position between theory and practice. They give themselves the justifying right to create not very accurate descriptions of modern national consciousness for subsequent not very successful application.

This consciousness took a methodologically "convenient" form but not because evil and deceit filled it. It seems that this is the easiest way to solve all ontological problems. Hegel, realizing that initially, it was an assumption about the opposition of oneself and one's subject, formulated the conclusion: consciousness itself put a (pillow for the laziness of thought) [12, p. 43], for itself. As a result, it all the time comes across the same paradox and does the same dar un salto mortal, that no matter how much it cognizes an object, its "in itself" will always remain a "thing in itself." In the same way, no matter how much it transforms it in its image and likeness, the object will still not correspond to the intention of the transformer.

Contradictory grounds that are inconsistent among themselves space fill the statement about modern war without adversaries. The same myth of political strategists is the assertion about the national identity as a tabula rasa. It, like any consciousness, has such a powerful transcendental unity [15] that individuals can still envy. How not to recall here the laconic definition of spirit, when Hegel says, this spirit is that when "I" which is "we" and "we" which is "I" merge into one [11].

Asserting that by external means, by streams of targeted information through social networks, bloggers, TV channels, etcetera it is possible to influence the Panidea of this or that world-historical people, with the help of which this nation itself checks the information for compliance with reality (the experience of truth), means – to create another myth. The diversity of national identities has never existed as a fact. To understand the way of the ascent of forms of consciousness in phenomenology is the same thing as to understand the fate of national self-consciousnesses in history. Thus, the method of "Phenomenology of Spirit" and "Philosophy of History" coincide.

Separate forms of consciousness in phenomenology do not exist for each other, do not understand, and are not interested in each other [16].

In the philosophy of history, we are dealing with the same interpenetration of philosophy and history. One cannot do without a "ladder" of world forms of consciousness and their experience of ascent from one level to another.

J. Deleuze and F. Guattari use the metaphor of rhizome – rhizomes, tubers and oppose it to the metaphor of "wood." They try to use it to distinguish between two historical eras: modern and postmodern [8]. Indeed, in the tuberous root, the

elements are homogeneous, while in the tree the trunk is not a root, and branches are not a trunk, a flower isn't a branch, etcetera.

Conclusions of the research. Thus, in our opinion, the final image is even more consistent with Hegel's thought: to provide the individual with a ladder. This image is the essence of rectilinear movement, which, one can draw attention to, is accented in the continuous numeric numbering of the chapters of the text of Phenomenology. The translators of Hegel's Phenomenology were confused not only by the consonance of the German die Leiter – the staircase and der Leiter – the guide, the leader.

In our opinion, the final image is even more consistent with Hegel's thought: to provide the individual with a ladder. This image is the essence of rectilinear movement, which, one can draw attention to, is accented in the continuous numeric numbering of the chapters of the text of Phenomenology. The translators of Hegel's Phenomenology were confused not only by the consonance of the German die Leiter – the staircase and der Leiter – the guide, the leader. Not. We see two sides of the perception of translators living in the period of the ideology of partisanship. On one level, they felt in Hegel's text the presence of transitions of dialectic and an attempt to look at the essence of the matter in another way (the point of view of the dialectic of reflection) [7]. On the other, they looked inside the present (after all, a hundred years had passed!). They even peered into the future, when this reflection in all its glory would unleash all its might.

Moreover, the very fact that E. Amenitskaya, K. Miloradovich, and other translators of Hegel's Phenomenology tempted to reproduce the metaphor in translation. The metaphor of a guide connects the understanding of the role of consciousness of the phenomenologist with the millennial church tradition of interpreting a similar passage from the Gospel of John, ch. 16. Article 13. When He, the Spirit of truth, comes, He will guide you into all truth, it says in William Brenham's Guide Preached in Jeffersonville In 1962. The fact is that the "guide" in the synodal translation sounds like "mentor." But the ideology of partisanship, when the party is for the people, and the leader for the party are guides and mentors (the most conscious part of any revolutionary movement), is a phenomenon that embraced the entire cultural and historical plane of the 20th century! Maybe it makes sense to add the metaphors of J. Deleuze and F. Guattari – a wood-ladder (modern) and a modern rhizome (postmodern), also a metaphor for Dante's guide (mentor in all circles of hell) by Virgil? Otherwise, the transition from the historical chain of events to the rhizome of "equal existence" of modernity will look painfully abrupt.

Historically, we can trace the "ladder" of the development of the unity of national self-consciousness. While nowadays, its existence is possible either as "fragments" or as "repetitions" of the steps of this ladder. The ubiquitous phenomenon of international law and the rushing phenomena of multiple/dual nationality,

feminism, LGBT people, etcetera – this is the verdict of world history, which can be reborn only in the form of philosophy. And our contemporary is right in his way, saying that the world exists to enter the book.

In the rhizome of modern national consciousness, there is, most likely, a struggle for almost biological survival. The era of postmodernism deviates further and further from the classic dichotomy truth is not the truth and sinks deeper and deeper into the emotional horizon like it or not like it. And for the future philosopher of history, it, as an object, will not cause anything but indifference by definition. This study shows that not even a holistic, but only a partial explication of the method of German classical philosophy allows to employ it in phenomenological studies of any forms of consciousness, and thereby transforms the science of phenomenology of spirit from a museum exhibit to an existing modern science.

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МІФИ А́КТОРІВ КОНСЦІЄНТАЛЬНИХ ВОЄН

У статті розглядається все більш популярна теза про консцієнтальну сутність сучасної війни. Творці та прихильники цієї концепції говорять про війни для пере-

моги (знищення) свідомості. Як на відмітну характеристику вони вказують на суперечливість цих конфліктів — на те, що в них відбувається протистояння між одним і всіма. У ході дослідження з'ясовується, що трактування цих воєн як таких, що не мають конкретного ворога (немає ворога), дійсно має право на існування, але тільки не щодо сучасності, а щодо Всесвітньої історії.

Крім того, теза про те, що сучасна війна – це «війна свідомості», неминуче підводить науку до проблем методології розуміння феномену свідомості.

Ключові слова: концієнтальна війна, сучасне ведення війна, «війна свідомості», феномен свідомості, національна свідомість, а́ктори сучасних консцієнтальних загроз.

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