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Panfilov Oleksandr Yuriyovych, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Professor,
Professor of the Department of Sociology and Political Science, Yaroslav Mudryi
National Law University, Kharkiv, Ukraine
e-mail: o.yu.panfilov@nlu.edu.ua
ORCID ID: 0000-0002-8997-0120

Savchenko Olga Oleksandrivna, PhD, Associate Professor,
Professor of the Foreign Languages Department, Ivan Kozhedub Kharkiv
National Air Force University, Ukraine
e-mail: savolg106@gmail.
ORCID ID: 0000-0003-0085-7189

ORGANIZATIONAL WARS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF PRESSURE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The article focuses on the fact that wars acquire a hybrid character in the 21st century. It is emphasized that the new ways of waging war are aimed at destroying the state from the inside by unbalancing all organizational systems of the state, when national features are destroyed, economic and political subordination to the aggressor occurs. The article details the essence and content of modern wars that are referred to as organizational wars and highlights some aspects of their essence are highlighted in the context of international relations. It is shown that the main tool of organizational warfare is the technology of «controlled chaos», which involves the use of a strategy of indirect approach and effects-based operations, and that the maximum effect of organizational weapons is achieved in network societies.

Keywords: *organizational warfare, the strategy of «indirect approach», effects-based operation, organizational weapons*

Problem setting. The wars of the 21st century are significantly different from the wars of previous times, including the wars and military conflicts of the past century, since the confrontation between individual countries and their coalitions takes place under fundamental changes in the international security system. This becomes especially evident in recent years when tectonic shifts have taken place in the world order, which has exacerbated the new conflicts. A characteristic feature of modern confrontation between states is the fact that there does not exist a common understanding of the procedures for transitioning to a state of war and the signs of the beginning of a military conflict. This translates in practice into the use of military

force without a formal declaration of war, when the opposing parties and their allies are not clearly defined and new actors appear to act in military operations, and non-standard methods of warfare are used. The practice of the last decade shows that modern wars are acquiring a hybrid character. Such definitions as hybridwarfare, mixed warfare, non-standard warfare, diffuse warfare, war of controlled chaos, etc., are used in numerous scientific publications. These definitions largely characterize a new type of war, especially in terms of ways of waging modern wars. Ukrainian and Russian military scholars and experts who work in the sphere of understanding the phenomenon of war from a philosophical point of view have a tendency to refer to wars where enemy parties do not shoot at one another, where people are not killed, bombs are not dropped, where military personnel of the enemy army do not act directly, but when countries economically and politically submit to the aggressor, when their national features are destroyed, as organizational wars. This mirrors the modern trend of the transition from wars with the extermination of the enemy to wars focused on self-disorganization and self-orientation in order to preserve the existing resource base.

Recent research and publications analysis. Currently, the topics and areas of studies in the field of international relations and military-theoretical views on the use of military force are largely devoted to the analysis of the processes of transformation of the generally accepted concepts of war and peace, and the assessment of the changed conditions of warfare.

All modern concepts of war and theories of warfare are based on doctrinal provisions of C. von Clausewitz. War, according to C. Clausewitz, is not an autonomous, isolated phenomenon, it expresses political goals that depend on the relationship of states. This is an act of violence designed to force the enemy to fulfil a certain will and at the same time has a pulsating character. C. Clausewitz believed that physical violence is just one of the possible means, the main goal of war is to impose own will on the enemy. At the same time, if war is an act of violence, it affects feelings. According to C. Clausewitz, the resistance of the enemy is the result of two interrelated factors: the amount of means the enemy has (military power) and the will to win [1]. He understood war as a clash of forces that act freely but not according to law. When the actions reach extremes, the war becomes absolute, that is, it reaches absolute violence, leading to total destruction. Thus, according to C. Clausewitz, war has two poles, two peaks, two elements in its essence: violence and politics.

According to S. Brzezinski, S. Huntington, and other scholars, due to geo-economic competition for planetary resources and markets for goods and services, which result in global economic crises, highly developed states need to create appropriate advantages over geopolitical opponents, which gives rise to a corresponding conflict in the system of international relations. Consequently, the

need for military force is growing, but in modern conditions, non-standard ways of achieving geostrategic or geo-economic goals are becoming more advantageous [2; 3]. Modern wars can be defined as «nonconventional», which, according to A. Illarionov, use all methods and technologies at the same time, combining the techniques of hard and soft power [4, p. 77].

Many scientific achievements of foreign and domestic scientists are devoted to the analysis of the features of such wars. It is relevant to mention such well-known researchers, politicians, historians and theorists of the problems of war and peace as Z. Brzezinski, A. Bogdanov, L. Hart, G. Filimonov, V. Gorbulin, O. Dzoban, G. Kissinger, S. Kurginyan, V. Mandragelya, S. Mann, J. Nye, G. Pocheptsov, M. Senchenko, V. Serebryannikov, V. Slipchenko, V. Smolyanyuk, A. Toffler, M. Trebin, S. Tyushkevich, S. Huntington, V. Tsyganov and so on. The works of these researchers, devoted to the problems of geopolitics, the essence, and causes of wars, information, and psychological confrontation, are quite thorough and contain a lot of factual material [5–14]. At the same time, it should be emphasized that specific studies on the essence and content of modern wars hereinafter called organizational wars are not enough in the scientific literature.

Paper objective. The goal of the article is analyse the phenomenon of organizational warfare, which we understand not only as a fight aimed at destroying assets – in the form of people or infrastructure – which are either state-owned or state-controlled but as a battle for the mind through cyberspace capability and the network society, which is not the prerogative of any state but a field open for manipulations with a human being's consciousness. The objective is also to specify some aspects of the essence of organizational wars in international relations.

Paper main body. S. Kurginyan defines organizational warfare as «a conscious and purposeful attack on the organization of the target core, subsystems and control links of the enemy system», and specifies that «organizational warfare is, first of all, the actions the attacker needs to control the enemy's motivations necessary to make organizational decisions in all spheres of his social and state system» [15]. Regarding the sphere of interstate relations, organizational warfare is a system of procedures that allows the policy of a hostile state to be reoriented in the right direction without the use of force [16].

N. Senchenko notes that organizational warfare is a system of informational, ideological, managerial, economic, psychological, political, and other actions against the enemy, which are coordinated in terms of purpose, place, time, and cost, and force the enemy to reorient towards goals that are unacceptable for survival. This is the replacement of the system of basic values of the target state with the values of the aggressor state as more promising [17, p. 7].

Generally, researchers emphasize that the main tasks of organizational wars are to disorient the behaviour of the population of the enemy state, strengthen centrifugal

trends in its society, exacerbate contradictions in the system of its cultural codes, impose development programs unacceptable to its economy, and create situational social groups that require a radical reformatting the ideological and political interests of this state, and so on.

The main instrument of organizational warfare is the technology of «controlled chaos». According to M. Senchenko, this technology is designed to totally destabilize government bodies on the territory of the enemy, reduce mobilization preparedness, destroy national identity, and turn the population into rootless, controlled cosmopolitans who are positively disposed towards the future occupation [17, p. 45]. This is a complex system mechanism, the elements of which are arbitrarily interconnected, and its use can result in multi-vector variants of development.

The technology of «controlled chaos» involves the use of the strategy of «indirect approach», «soft power», «smart power», and «effects-based operations». The purpose of the technology is to reformat the necessary states, rebuild the mass consciousness of their nations, reduce resistance and self-organization, and form a society with the erased memory.

The British military theorist B. Liddell Hart thinks that the strategy of indirect action should not be considered only through the concepts of war. In his opinion, the methods of indirect actions are the key to the practical solution of any problem in which the fundamental factors are a person and opposing interests, which leads to conflict [18].

Ukrainian scholar N. Shevchenko understands the concept of «strategy of indirect approach» as a system of symmetrical and asymmetric approaches and a set of actions of the active party (state, block), which the future build conditions for the successful implementation of its policy of defending interests through creating a situation of disorientation of the enemy in the context of dialectical changes in the space of confrontation [19]. In the context of geopolitical and geo-economic approaches, this process occurs through the systematic implementation of measures of indirect strategic impact on the object of expansion, which implies, among other things, the formation of hybrid threats to the enemy. In the military-political context, the main goal of such a strategy is to weaken the enemy's resistance, rather than attempt to suppress it, «disarm» the enemy and make fulfil the winner's will [20].

The strategy of indirect approach is implemented along with the theory of reflexive control originated in Russia and defined as «a method of transmitting specially prepared information to a partner or opponent in order to incline them «voluntarily» to make a predetermined decision desired by the initiator of the action» [21], orwell-known idea of perception management developed in the USA, which the Department of Defence defines as «actions to convey and/or deny selected

information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning as well as to intelligence systems and leaders at all levels to influence official estimates, ultimately resulting in foreign behaviours and official actions favourable to the originator's objectives. In various ways, perception management combines truth projection, operations security, cover and deception, and psychological operations» [22].

In their book *War and Anti-War*, Alvin and Heidi Toffler list the following as tools for perception management—atrocity accusations; hyperbolic inflations; demonisation and/or dehumanisation; polarisation; claim of divine sanction; meta-propaganda [23].

«The US military has demonstrated use of perception management multiple times in modern warfare, even though it has proven to take a hit to its credibility among the American people», Indian Brigadier B. M. Kapoor says. He believes that «perception management is now an accepted part of wielding international strategic influence. In affecting the perception of a foreign government, the goal is to change the foreign government's policy to support your political interest. The goal could also be to influence the foreign government's perceptions of elements of the foreign society» [24].

The Chinese government has also used strategies to manage the perception of their country to the rest of the world. Chinese military scholars argue that their nation has a long history of conducting «psychological operations», a phrase that connotes important aspects of strategic deception and, to a certain degree, what the US Department of Defense portrays as perception management. For example, several articles published by the PLA's Academy of Military Science (AMS) journal *Zhongguo Junshi Kexue*, examine psychological warfare and psychological operations mainly as a deception-oriented function of military strategy [25].

Speaking about the theory of reflexive control, the Russian military expert S. Komov defines this phenomenon as a complex of intellectual methods of information warfare, applied through non-verbal informational contact between the subject and the object. According to the scientist, to affect the enemy, this type of intellectual warfare features techniques aimed at distracting the enemy, overloading him with conflicting information, splitting probable coalition, paralyzing the opposing side's actions, exhausting, deceiving, or calming the enemy down, intimidating or provoking the enemy, offering to act in a predetermined way or forcing the enemy to do this, and so on [26, p. 388–389].

Another Russian military expert, F. Chausov focuses on the effectiveness of such methods of reflexive control as disinformation, provocation, blackmailing, and compromising the geopolitical enemy. However, the most important threat is disinformation campaigns, which result in pre-planned impact on public opinion or decision-makers [26, p. 389–390].

The main segment where the intentions of the initiators and executors of organizational wars intersect is effects-based operations (EBO), a United States military concept that emerged during the Persian Gulf War in the design and execution of the Desert Storm air campaign, which is defined by the United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), as «a process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome or effect on the enemy through the synergistic and cumulative application of the full range of military and nonmilitary capabilities at all levels of conflict» [27].

Air Force Glossary defines the effects-based approach to operations as «an approach in which operations are planned, executed, assessed, and adapted to influence or change systems or capabilities in order to achieve desired outcomes» [28].

The essence of this concept lies in the fact that in order to support superior decision-making and to understand the enemy's systems, the philosophical (not physical) center of gravity of the combatants is determined and evaluated, in other words – the elements that determine their freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight, such as leadership, system essentials, infrastructure, the population as well as military assets. P. K. Davis suggests defining EBO as «operations conceived and planned in a systems framework that considers the full range of direct, indirect, and cascading effects—effects that may, with different degrees of probability, be achieved by the application of military, diplomatic, psychological, and economic instruments». As for EBO mechanisms, he mentions «speed, agility, parallel operations, decisiveness, creating shock and awe, and attacking the enemy's mindset and conceptual centers of gravity». P. K. Davis classifies the EBO effects as physical ones, such as «damage equipment/systems», «disrupt processes», «kill people» and behavioural ones that are typed as «demoralize», «paralyze/slow», «divert/confuse» and «influence» [29].

Smith proposes a fairly similar taxonomy, in his view, the EBO effects fall into two general areas: physical and psychological. Physical effects can be further described as «destruction», «physical attrition», «chaos/entropy». Psychological effects can be categorized under «chaos/entropy», «foreclosure» (curtailing options), «shock», «psychological attrition» [30].

Donald Lowe and Simon Ng rephrase «the basic categorizations of physical and psychological/behavioural effects as the change of state of an entity, whether it is physical or mental» [31].

It can be seen that the above definitions of EBO are postulated in a similar way, all of them, one way or another, agree that a key component of Effects-based operations is the cognitive sphere, in other words, the consciousness of the side that attacks and the side that is attacked. Specifically, the cognitive sphere or area of consciousness is the place where the effect-based operations are carried out. The cognitive sphere also comprises such phenomena as doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures, ability to resist or readiness to accept new meanings and values.

Ukrainian researcher A. Senchenko notes that the effects-based operations are aimed at developing the behavioural structures of all participants in the political process. He believes that not only allies, but also forces that have chosen a neutral position, and enemies (who might even not know) are involved in a scenario imposed from the outside and act in accordance with the will of those who control the effects-based operations, turning into political puppets. This is defeat even before war starts, since when the open confrontation begins, both the enemy, neutral forces, and allies are completely subject to the rules of the conflict initiators and perform programmed actions [32, p. 41].

The object of impact under effects-based operations is disorganized simultaneously in all areas. In the socio-cultural and cognitive spheres, the country-aggressor acts by deploying lobby groups and social networks (marketing, human rights, research, educational, charitable, and similar) around the world, which openly or covertly propagate and export the way of life of the affecting country; advances own values, broadcasts the corresponding cultural and worldview codes, and makes network revolutions.

In the information sphere, impact is exercised through the total domination of the military-strategic complex of the aggressor country, its private corporations, the media, and communication providers in the field of collecting, processing, and disseminating information. In physical terms, impact is carried out in a hot war as a result of the rapid and effective destruction of enemy forces and means by using precise weapons and other latest military-technical achievements. The effects-based operation means the establishment of complete control over all participants in actual or probable hostilities (that is, not only during direct confrontation against the enemy, like the classic wars of the industrial period, but also during periods of peace or crisis, and not only against the enemy but also in regard to ally or neutral forces) and their total manipulation in all situations.

In the technology of «controlled chaos» an important place belongs to organizational weapons [33]. The basis of organizational weapons is special technologies of organizational management reflection. They are ordered sets of methods (models, programs, strategies, procedures, forms) for implementing managerial decisions that are constantly being improved, introducing innovations, supporting information, ideological and other necessary structural ties, selecting and training personnel, planning, reporting, controlling, and so on. Since the basis of any organizational system is people whose motivation is based on physiological, social, and informational needs, the productive, correctly calculated use of organizational weapons in a certain organizational environment (primarily in the field of power) has a direct impact not only on the level of security of the state organizational system but also the probability of its existence. A prolonged massive informational and moral-psychological influence of a destructive nature, passing

through the consciousness of every member of society, creates a real threat to the existence of the nation as a result of the transformation of the main worldview, cultural and ideological attitudes, that is, changes in the internal organizational environment that determines the system of the country's life.

The organizational weapons are directed at representatives of social groups and institutions directly or indirectly involved in the long-term and short-term regulation of the population behaviour. The managerial and creative elite, educators, and well-known cultural and moral authorities of the state become the objects of the impact of organizational weapons.

Popular in the media space people as well as «shadow authorities» fall into the sphere of planning actions of organizational weapons since they affect the behaviour of the population. A separate area is to create new subjects for the use of organizational weapons in the form of subculture, non-traditional confessions, alternative educational and training structures.

Thus, the organizational weapon is a way of activating the pathological system within the functional system of the target state, in which the pathological system absorbs the carrier's resources for its development. A characteristic feature of a pathological system (the use of organizational weapons) is that it affects the functional system of society, first of all, from the outside, from a hierarchically higher power level of the system organization. In addition, the use of organizational weapons is not always visible to traditional forms of scientific observation and is incomprehensible within the framework of the traditional logic of ordinary knowledge. Destruction as the impact of the organizational weapon is aimed at achieving results that lie in the «value system» of the party that initiates the use of this weapon.

The use of organizational weapons achieves its maximum effect in network societies since, according to M. Castells, the network society is a dynamic and open system. The network in modern society acts as a building material for the organization of joint activities of people, and also represents a structure that ignores boundaries. M. Castells says that «it is networks that make up the new social morphology of our societies, and the spread of «network» logic largely affects the course and result of processes related to production, everyday life, culture, and power» [34].

The network feature, unlike all other forms of organizational structure, as R. Voitovich notes, is that it does not have clearly defined centers and boundaries. It is the network as the main form of organization of the modern world order that is a flexible system of situational connections that are formed between the subjects of the global space, which makes it possible to record a new social structure that characterizes the variability and mobility of the modern world development. That is, it comes to the level of social self-organization, which ensures the internal integrity and consistency of the network, each element of which is an integral part

of the network system of a more general nature and exists in it on an equal basis [35, p. 5].

Network structures are funds, means of communication, mass media, transnational corporations, banking structures, public, religious, non-governmental and non-profitable organizations, political organizations, intelligence services of different states, editorial offices of newspapers and magazines – both large and amateur online publications or blogs that are engaged to the conflict by one of the parties in a certain way. These may be associations or clubs of hunters, philatelists, or collectors of antiques that have links with other similar clubs in different parts of the world, whose members periodically come together for a general meeting or forums. A network is a medium through which a certain signal can be passed, which will be perceived, transmitted further, and implemented. Thus, new ideas, other strategic models, foreign logic are easily perceived in the network society, which means that such a society can be conquered.

The consequences of the use of organizational weapons are the replacement of the system of basic values and meanings of the target state with the values and meanings of the aggressor state as more promising. G. Pocheptsov argues that meanings are governed by estimates and values of the past tense, that they are not invented now, they are taken ready-made from the arsenals of semantic weapons since all these notions are located around two poles: Good and Evil (right and wrong). «Our» ideas are always right while «foreign» ones are wrong [36]. In this context, organizational weapons feature by rethinking facts and values in favour of the aggressor.

Any sign system has two sides: value and meaning. The technocratic industrial society, preferring the practical value of things, underestimates the role of meanings. Technocrats usually look down on the humanitarians but have been losing out to them more and more lately. The semantic aspect of organizational weapons can change existing goals to necessary or unnecessary ones, reducing or exaggerating the existing significance of things and actions, legalizing the forbidden and tabooed things. Such influences require that a completely different toolkit be used. Facts fade into the background and lose primary importance. The reliability of a fact is not an important parameter; another fact can be easily found if the previous one is not perceived. The fact is secondary, the necessary image meaning is primary. A. Kharitonenko notes that semantic sabotage «starts» from an image, a metaphor, a well-chosen cliché word to which the real facts are subsequently tailored. The enemy in this war separates the image and the fact, making the desired image bright but the unnecessary one cloudy and controversial [37, p. 161]. At the same time, the main methods are reinterpretation, conceptual translation, the mythologization of consciousness, and ritualization of behavior [38].

Conclusions of the research. Summing up the above, it should be emphasized that the effects-based operations concept is not a new idea, it revises the historical

wisdom of great luminaries of the past who articulated the importance of impact on the enemy's thoughts and beliefs so that to gain the upper hand, to secure victory. At the present stage, elements of organizational warfare are being actively introduced and can be successfully applied in any region where there are economic and social problems, regardless of the ethnic and confessional aspects. The ultimate goal of organizational wars is the weakening or destruction of nations through the interception of control of these states by the aggressor. When solving such problems, different technologies of «soft forms» of controlled chaos are used in combination with military aggression (Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Ukraine). As a result, such processes lead to situations when organizers of the war concentrate control over the financial, military, and information resources of the world community.

Such technology has the greatest effect in network societies, which are actively involved in globalization processes. Network societies are much less organized, do not have a high level of critical thinking, and are much closer to chaos, unpredictability, and spontaneity, than a society based on a rational hierarchy.

Using the network principle of action, organizational weapons cover all spheres of society from education, media, and science, to economic and political processes. The threat to national security from such technology at the first stages of its development may not manifest itself outwardly, since it always hides behind beautiful and righteous slogans of liberal values, freedom of speech, democracy, tolerance, and so on. When the necessary conditions are created in the country, the network principle of entropy is promptly implemented and leads to the complete collapse of statehood. It is extremely difficult to resist the technology of organizational warfare; comprehensive measures to combat this evil have not yet been developed, which allows us to consider this technology one of the global threats to the modern world order.

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Панфілов Олександр Юрійович, доктор філософських наук, професор, професор кафедри соціології та політології, Національний юридичний університет імені Ярослава Мудрого, м. Харків, Україна

Савченко Ольга Олександрівна, кандидат філософських наук, доцент, професор кафедри іноземних мов, Харківський національний університет Повітряних Сил імені Івана Кожедуба, Україна

ОРГАНІЗАЦІЙНІ ВІЙНИ ЯК ІНСТРУМЕНТ ТИСКУ В МІЖНАРОДНИХ ВІДНОСИНАХ

Метою статті є розкриття деяких аспектів сутності організаційних війн у міжнародних відносинах. Висвітлюється, що головним інструментом організаційної війни є технологія «керованого хаосу», яка передбачає застосування стратегії непрямой дії та операцій базового ефекту. Деталізовано концепт стратегії непрямих дій, що реалізуються в комплексі з методами управління рефлексією або сприйняттям супротивника, тобто його когнітивною сферою, що виступає основним сегментом дії операцій базових ефектів. Підкреслюється, що операція базового ефекту означає встановлення повного контролю над усіма учасниками актуальних або можливих дій і тотальне маніпулювання ними в усіх ситуаціях. Показано, що при застосуванні технології «керованого хаосу» в міжнародних відносинах актуалізується використання організаційної зброї, яка є впорядкованою сукупністю методів (моделей, програм, стратегій, процедур, форм) реалізації управлінських рішень. Використовуючи мережевий принцип дії, організаційна зброя охоплює всі сфери суспільства від освіти, ЗМІ й науки до економічних і політичних процесів.

Ключові слова: організаційна війна, стратегія непрямих дій, операції базового ефекту, організаційна зброя.

Панфилов Александр Юрьевич, доктор философских наук, профессор, профессор кафедры социологии и политологии, Национальный юридический университет имени Ярослава Мудрого, г. Харьков, Украина

Савченко Ольга Александровна, кандидат философских наук, доцент, профессор кафедры иностранных языков, Харьковский национальный университет Воздушных Сил имени Ивана Кожедуба, Украина

ОРГАНИЗАЦИОННЫЕ ВОЙНЫ КАК ИНСТРУМЕНТ ДАВЛЕНИЯ В МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ ОТНОШЕНИЯХ

Целью статьи является раскрытие некоторых аспектов сущности организационных войн в международных отношениях. Раскрывается, что главным инструментом организационной войны является технология «управляемого хаоса», предусматривающая применение стратегии непрямых действий и операций базового эффекта. Детализирован концепт стратегии непрямых действий, реализуемых в комплексе с методами управления рефлексией или восприятием противника – его когнитивной сферой, выступающей основным сегментом действия операций базовых эффектов. Подчеркивается, что операция базового эффекта означает установление полного контроля за всеми участниками актуальных или возможных действий и тотальное манипулирование ими во всех ситуациях. Показано, что при применении технологии «управляемого хаоса» в международных отношениях актуализируется использование организационного оружия, которое является упорядоченной совокупностью методов (моделей, программ, стратегий, процедур, форм) реализации постоянно совершенствующихся управленческих решений. Используя сетевой принцип действия, организационное оружие охватывает все сферы общества от образования, СМИ и науки до экономических и политических процессов.

Ключевые слова: организационная война, стратегия непрямых действий, операции базового эффекта, организационное оружие.

