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## PECULIARITIES OF CORRUPTION COMBATING IN AUTHORITIES OF UKRAINE IN CONDITIONS OF MODERN SOCIO-POLITICAL REALITIES

*The article emphasizes that corruption in Ukraine during the years of independence turned into a multifaceted systemic phenomenon with devastating consequences, which led to the institutionalization of corruption relations, the formation of informal destructive institutions, which prolonged the practice of clans in political and many other spheres of the society which lives by double standards. The author analyzes and evaluates some of the anti-corruption measures taken by the authorities for the recent time and concludes that they have an imitative character.*

**Keywords:** *corruption, corruption practice, anticorruption mechanisms, discretionary power, informal destructive policy institutions.*

**Problem setting.** In the beginning of the year 2020, one more scandal erupted in Ukraine over the high salaries and New Year's bonuses of the governmental officials. The Prime Minister O. Goncharuk explained that by raising the salaries of high-ranking officials the government can overcome corrupt practices in power. In doing so, he admitted that previous officials of all levels, for almost three decades of our state's existence, shamelessly and unpunishedly «used to steal tens and hundreds of millions of dollars in shadow schemes» [1], transferring budget money to their personal accounts and deceiving the Ukrainian people. At the same time, representatives of the clan-oligarchic system, which strengthened even further after the latest elections, have remained on top of the domestic political beau monde and continue to 'root' in various institutions of power, through the placement of their relatives, matchmakers, god relatives, etc. in governing positions with appropriate funding. But to date, no information has been received by the society about punishing 'predecessors' for official abuses and illegal enrichment, which every day loses the hope and waits for justice.

Consequently, that in order that new ministers, People's Deputies and so-called top managers are not to be tempted to abuse their official position (which is

a privilege in itself) and are responsible for performing their functions, the governmental officials should be given a decent (!) salary, which, according to the former Vice-Prime Minister of Ukraine Pavlo Rozenko, has increased for top officials by an average of 3.5–5 times and 2.5 times for the People's Deputies of Ukraine, that is, will exceed 100000 hryvnias (since January 1, 2020) [2]. Although the Speaker of the Parliament Dmitryi Razumkov denied the latest information, saying that the salary of «the people's servants» will be increased only by 3 thousand UAH, which is connected with the cost of living, which since January 1, 2020, according to the Law «On the State Budget of Ukraine for 2020 year», will amount to one person to 2027 UAH, and by the end of the year should rise to 2189 UAH.

The question is: why not to raise the wages and salaries of all working taxpayers, whose money fills the state budget and holds the huge state apparatus, not to mention pensioners and other layers of the population who need social support from the state? May be doctors, teachers, scientists, engineers, military officers, police officers, firefighters, builders, miners, farmers, or any other employee from a variety of industries can also start irresponsibly taking on their responsibilities, taking bribes or stealing what one can steal in order to be given a «decent salary on which one can normally live», if to follow the logic of the Prime Minister of Ukraine?

With the onset of the «fight» against corruption in power before the New 2020 year, «in the regions, people were massively reduced with additional payments and allowances due to the banal reason of lack of funds. This is applied, in particular, to petty officials in district administrations, teachers and doctors» [3]. At the same time, the Cabinet of Ministers repealed the previous government's decision to increase salaries in the sphere of education by 20% in 2020 due to lack of adequate financial support. At the same time, in the interview to Interfax-Ukraine, Education Minister Anna Novosad cynically and offensively for the Ukrainian educators and scholars stated that her monthly salary of 36 000 UAH will not be enough for raising a baby if she wants to give birth to it or for any savings, except for running costs [4]. At the same time, according to the State Statistics Service, during January–August 2019, the average salary in the sphere of education was one of the lowest – 7909 UAH [5]. And all these is despite the fact that many school teachers, who are mostly women, have real, not dreamy children, who need to be fed, dressed, taught, treated, etc. Tens of thousands of scientific and pedagogical staff of the country with the salaries of 4,5–6 times less than Ms. Novosad has, do not only have a car but also their own housing, experiencing every day psycho-emotional load during an unregulated working day and having a huge degree of responsibility for their work, no less than the Minister of Education has. It proves the proverb: «To someone the soup is liquid but to someone the pearls are small».

Thus, the fight against corruption in the government in our country began with the end of the «poverty era» for the government, to improve the financial situation

of which there were millions of hryvnias in the budget, and with the increased tension in the society, which found itself in conditions of some more challenges organized by a team of so-called unsystematic politicians who, like their predecessors, instead of actions required by the country as a whole, ignoring the needs of the Ukrainian people, use the State for their own whims. Thus, the activities of state authorities in the field of combating corruption do not meet the demands of society and are imitative. The anti-corruption measures initiated by the authorities appear to be another profanity, which only reinforces the problem of a certain discrepancy between declaring by civil servants and officials their intentions and the real state of affairs in the fight against corruption. That is why, the issues of fighting and overcoming corruption in the authorities do not lose their *relevance* in the current socio-political realities.

**Analysis of recent research and publications.** The issues of preventing and combating corruption in public authorities do not cease to arouse a lively interest in foreign (I. Amundsen, P. Bardhan, A. M. Barra, M. Bec, M. Beenstock, J. Gerring, A. W. Horowitz, E. Dabla-Noris, M. Johnston, V. T. Levin, F. T. Lui, P. Mauro, F. Mendes, S. Rose-Ackerman, D. Serra, S. C. Thacker, J. Tirole, J. E. Foster, Carl J. Friedrich, A. J. Heidenheimer, L. Wilde, S. Huntington, P. Chander, etc.) [6–21] and domestic (L. V. Andrushchenko, Y. V. Bokovykova, A. V. Borovyk, O. I Vasilyeva, E. V. Vdovichenko, A. V. Voloshenko, V. G. Gornyk, V. S. Zhuravsky, D. V. Kostenko, S. O. Kravchenko, V. I. Litvinenko, M. I. Melnyk, D. G. Mikhailenko, M. I. Mikhalchenko, O. M. Mikhalchenko, E. V. Nevmerzhitskyi, V. V. Nonyk, A. I. Pogorelova, E. V. Rasyuk, O. V. Shkuropat, S. B. Yakovenko and others) [22–39] experts who devoted their works to the analysis of various aspects of the investigated problems. At the same time, a number of key issues for anti-corruption activities, such as the features of preventing and counteracting corruption in power in the current socio-political realities in Ukraine, remain not enough investigated. It is unfortunate that most of the constructive proposals for solving the problem of corruption in our country, which were created by the scientists on the basis of various researches, were discussed and corrected on numerous scientific-practical events and in the media; even the current normative base (over 100 legal normative acts: Decrees of the President of Ukraine, Resolutions of the Verkhovna Rada, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and sectoral normative acts of anti-corruption orientation), the Ukrainian politicum simply ignores.

**Formulation of goals.** The purpose of the article is to analyze the peculiarities of the fight against corruption in the domestic socio-political space and to find the mechanisms for preventing and counteracting corruption in power in Ukraine in accordance with contemporary realities.

**Presenting main material.** Corruption, as an attributive phenomenon of power and monetary relations in a society that appeared with the state apparatus several

millennia ago by a caste of governmental people who quickly saw the possibility of using state power for personal gainful purposes [39, p. 59], mainly for their own enrichment, has gradually become an element of everyday life in practically every country. With its evolution, corruption, like an octopus, seized all spheres of social life, acquired many forms, manifestations and features, in various ways damaging the life of a man, society and the state, transforming into a modern world into a complex, systematic, multifaceted phenomenon with devastating consequences, destructive consequences, that «are constantly multiplied and difficult to calculate» [40].

International rankings show that corruption has sporadic manifestations in civilized and economically developed countries, because in democratic states there are real institutions of counterbalancing that hold the people in office off from abuse and related opportunities to gain illicit benefits, and a real opportunity to identify and punish high-ranking criminals [6, p. 10]. In Ukraine, during the years of independence, corruption has become widespread and has actually displaced the state as an imperative (determining) subject of power, appropriating and deforming fundamentally important social attributes [27, p. 27–28]. In turn, the weakening of state control and the imperfection of the legislation have influenced the progressive and intensive growth of the number and types of corruption offenses, the general decrease in the spiritual and moral potential of society, the rule of legal nihilism in it, the lack of faith in the inevitability of punishment [41].

Although practically all types of states declare the fight against corruption, any attempts to completely eradicate this destructive phenomenon within a particular country during a certain period of its development have not had long-lasting positive results, except that a temporary decrease in the manifestations of corrupt practices in certain spheres of life with the maintaining constant scrutiny to ensure that the level of corruption in the country remains minimal. Thus, according to an analysis of the results of the Corruption Perceptions Index in 2019, which is calculated by Transparency International since 1995, New Zealand and Denmark, which scored 87 out of 100, are among the 180 countries with the least corruption. Somalia (9), South Sudan (12) and Syria (13) are at the end of the list, where for a long time there is an unstable political situation, military conflicts, governments only partially control the territory, that is, corruption actually replaces the state. Ukraine ranks 126<sup>th</sup> in this ranking, losing its position, compared to the previous year, by 2 points [42]. So, while humankind is seeking the mechanisms and instruments of eradicating corruption that are relevant to contemporary realities, the leaders of states that are determined to eradicate this dangerous negative social phenomenon can use their experience and anticorruption expertise to get into «the club of less corrupt countries», who are considered prosperous.

The results of the fight against corruption are influenced by a number of factors, including a historical period characterized by appropriate means of influencing

corruption; geographical localization of the region to which the state belongs; institutional features of the state system; level of economic development and well-being of citizens; cultural, religious, historical traditions, etc. [24, p. 230]. But, considering all these factors combined, in combination with the rightly chosen measures (from purely repressive to preventive ones), it is difficult to hope during their implementation to succeed without the political will of the country's leaders, the unceasingly controlled application of a wide range of state anti-corruption regulatory imperatives (basic principles, decrees, instructions, orders, etc.), public support and activity of citizens interested in overcoming this dangerous phenomenon.

The society, understanding the destructive consequences of corruption, which negatively affect all aspects of the socio-economic and political development of the state, threaten the implementation of the principles of the rule of law and social justice, lead to the destruction of the foundations of law and order and sharply weaken all public institutions, reduce public confidence in power, lead society to its degradation, forming «double standards» of the members of society with morals and behavior, undermine the foundations of democracy and violate human rights, cause serious damage to Ukraine's image and prestige in the international arena, etc., does not reject the hope of finding appropriate mechanisms and tools, if not to reduce corruption to a minimum, at least to create an atmosphere of aversion to any corruption manifestations and relations.

Remaining in the group of countries trying to fight corruption, Ukraine seeks to follow the recommendations of Transparency International to reduce corruption influence on public relations, especially since after the victory of the Revolution of Dignity the preconditions for the country's elimination of corruption were created. However, in 2019, the Ukrainian state implemented or partially implemented only 6 of the 12 recommendations provided by Transparency International Ukraine that could improve our country's CPI (Corruption Perceptions Index). The government ignored most of the recommendations and brought the fight against corruption to naught. Ukraine's political elite continue to resist the anti-corruption movement of civil society. Its newly elected representatives lack not only the relevant knowledge, skills and experience of public administration, but also the political will and courage to move forward, and not to preserve the situation, covering by noisy public anti-corruption rhetoric and incomprehensible and unacceptable tools in society.

The individual actions of the Ukrainian authorities, which use discretion (at their discretion) as the main way of governing the state, in interpreting any law or decision proposed by it, no longer cause the excitement of the majority of Ukrainian citizens. Thus, in January 2020, Ukrainians experienced another shock when they learned about the huge monthly salaries received by high-ranking officials and some other persons empowered to perform state functions (from the lowest – UAH 32 386 thousand received by the Minister of the Cabinet of Ministers of

Ukraine D. Dubiletto up to UAH 1,9 million from the Director General of «Ukrposhta» Smilyanskyi I. Y., and this is without any allowances, financial aid, bonuses of 200–400%, etc. of payments from the state budget) compared to the average salary in the country (in December 2019 it amounted to 12264 UAH). At the same time, two draft laws (No 2720 and No 2720–1) were submitted by the Cabinet of Ministers to the Parliament for consideration of proposing not to link the minimum wage in the budgetary sphere with the cost of living (about UAH 2,000) but to form it annually, separately «taking into account the financial capacity of the state and local budgets», each time stating in the budget. That is, taking care of «ensuring the rights and interests of economic entities, citizens and the state» [43], the authorities, using the anomalies of «permitting» and regulatory functions of public administration, actually allow to set a minimum wage below the subsistence minimum to the state employees, which, in experts' opinion, is a gross violation of the right of citizens to equal pay for equal work for employees of the budgetary and extra-budgetary sectors and can lead to discrimination in the workplace, without even mentioning a significant financial state deterioration of these.

Can such actions of the authorities be described as different from corruption when high-ranking officials empowered to exercise public functions who exercise discretionary power – the power over the distribution of certain resources that do not belong to them, distribute them at their discretion [35, p. 41] «to whom pies and pancakes, to whom hum and bruises»? At first glance, everything is legal, transparent and accountable: they have informed the public about the over-amounted salaries and bonuses of the people in power, who have made declarations of property available, and after a negative evaluation of the information received from the citizens, have acted as a whole front in defense of improving their financial situation.

Undoubtedly, informing society through mass media about property and income of the power holders and electronic declaration of persons authorized to perform the functions of the state or local self-government in the Unified State Register of Declarations opened the possibility for anti-corruption bodies to control and expose cases of corruption and bribery. It was not even possible to imagine such a thing before the Maidan period, though the media reported about the luxurious life of representatives of the political elite and their families at the expense of the state, which angered the public, but no measures were taken to outright corrupt officials.

Thus, if the European practice of high-ranking officials reporting to the people on income is entrenched and the declarants are held criminally responsible for the assets and property the origin of which do not correspond to their earnings, such measures can be considered as one of the important anti-corruption mechanisms, which plays a preventive role and is an effective instrument of exposing persons in power involved in this type of offenses. At the same time, it is important that anti-corruption activities are not selective and concern officials of all levels, including

the highest and especially those suspected of corruption, which will help restore public confidence in the state and its representatives.

Although the overwhelming majority (72%) is positive or overwhelmingly positive about the opening of property declarations by the top society and the transparency it guarantees, 33% of Ukrainians doubt that e-declarations contain full information about public servants' salaries, considering that their real status of their income has little to do with the figures given in the official documents. Moreover, with the help of the Internet and the media, and in some cases directly, citizens have the opportunity to observe daily that some high-ranking officials continue to use their official position and authority primarily to obtain unjustified benefits and personal enrichment. According to the skeptical part of the population, the declarants disclose only the property that, as they think, can be verified, or consider the e-declaration procedure purely a formality, and therefore declare a minimal amount of property [44].

The perception of corruption by the population as one of the fast and relatively simple ways of solving problems, the achievement of the desired result, has created a «habit» in society for this phenomenon. Corruption has become the style and way of life of a very large circle of people, driven by the state of economic and political development of the country, national mentality and the circumstances under which the vast majority of the population, grew under conditions where corruption relations have become a social norm and corruption behavior has been justified [8, p. 862]. The integration of corruption practices into culture and the lack of public condemnation of meeting those needs that have been left out of formal procedures have contributed to the widespread spread of «grassroots», «household» corruption [19, p. 362–363], which, in turn, has led to spread of systemic corruption in society and shaping it as a «norm of life» rather than an anomaly. Therefore, when civil servants use their powers for private gain (such as getting a valuable gift for arranging someone for a prestigious job or even arranging a «better» table at a restaurant than other clients have because of their position or status), such actions are not called «corrupt» or «illegal», just perhaps immoral ones [7, p. 1321].

Although such actions do not carry social dangers such as bribery, organized and economic crime, etc., their deep penetration into the sphere of everyday relationships and daily life of the society is a powerful factor in demoralization of society, devaluation of moral values, deformation of individual and social psychology; destruction of spiritual and moral values; promotion of criminal psychology in the society; changes in the motivation of the officials in public administration, as well as citizens in various spheres of social life [32, p. 52]. Corruption poses an important danger in those areas on which daily life depends directly – ensuring public safety, health care, education, housing and communal services, etc. [37, p. 109]. The negligence and inactivity of the bureaucracy in these

areas undermines public confidence in public authorities and respect for the law, promotes the penetration of the criminal component in public administration and public relations.

That is why, in the current socio-political realities in Ukraine, including the continuation of the war in the east of Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, mass impoverishment of the great number of the population; constant rise in prices for food, medicine, tariffs for housing and communal services and transport services; low incomes of the country's residents (salaries, pensions and social benefits); continuous outflow of people, mostly young people, to work abroad, lack of proper level of social and legal security of the society and many other problems that have not been solved by the authorities for decades, it is very difficult for ordinary citizens to trust officials, who, justifying their assets and salaries of tens and sometimes even in the hundreds of thousands of hryvnias a month, when they say, «that it is impossible to have a fair and effective state until the officials receive a meager salary»?

And is it possible to have a healthy and educated nation if health workers and educators have wages and salaries below the national average? Can someone expect efficient and responsible work from anyone whose salaries will not meet the basic needs of their families, not to mention dangerous and uncomfortable working conditions, old, barely working equipment, etc.? And are high salaries of civil servants not a temptation for those who are only interested in money and not in the public good?

Global experience shows that corruption reduction does not necessarily follow wages raise. In India, for example, in 1997, the customs officers doubled their salaries, but they continued to take bribes because corruption rents were too high to refuse from additional source of income [45]. Moreover, high salaries can serve as another cover for corrupt people who lead a luxurious lifestyle. As the ex-People's Deputee from the Petro Poroshenko Bloc faction Oleg Petrenko says, explaining such not small official salaries of the representatives of «the Servant of People» by the fact that they need to cover the stolen, because elementary comparison of the ministers' way of life with the official salaries will never pass the check from any anti-corruption structure. Therefore, they calculated themselves hundreds of thousands, millions of hryvnias, and then, when inspected, to show why they lead such a lifestyle [46].

Thus, to recognize as successful the use of such an instrument to counteract corruption practices in power, as raising the already high salaries of the powerful, is impossible, since obtaining them benefits in the form of money contrary to the legitimate interests of society and the state, which are in difficult conditions of functioning, has rather signs corruption manifestations, not counteracting them.

The complexity of overcoming corruption in Ukraine with the help of relevant to modern realities mechanisms and tools is that the corruption environment has

a high capacity for self-organization and sustainable self-preservation, forming a «root system» that germinates and takes roots at «all levels of public administration from higher authorities to regional and district state administrations, law enforcement agencies and courts, the army, financial and economic, educational, medical and many other spheres of life of societies» [47, p. 189], adapting to certain objective circumstances and manifesting itself in various destructive forms, such as nepotism, nepotism, cronyism, patrimonialism, clientism, favoritism, etc.

Such diversity of manifestations of corruption in the domestic socio-political space contributed to the establishment and approval of clan-caste practice of state power, and under such circumstances to all important positions it appoints people who focus not on the interests of the majority of the population of the country, the public good and the achievement of these socially significant values, but on the internal corporate standards of personal devotion to the first person or his closest associates [48, p. 14]. There is a peculiar 'seizure' of the state through the unfair distribution of positions in the authorities, according to which preferences for obtaining a certain place are given on the basis of the closeness of relations (relatives, friends, party members), but not on the degree of professionalism, qualification, experience and competence of the candidates. Individuals appointed to the influential positions interact with their patron and form «the rules of the game» with him. Under these rules, an informal policy is pursued, in which the interests of the dominant group take priority over the interests of the public.

There is an institutionalization of numerous forms of corruption that are «rooted» in the already established and traditional network of political entities of Ukrainian society. Informal institutions (such as nepotism institution, institution of cronyism, or institutions of protectionism, «codes of honor», bribery, etc.), whose existence and activity are not regulated by law, make a real, mostly destructive influence on the functioning of social subsystems, they are not inferior to social institutions and become a source of inertia and fuel corruption in power. Despite the growing democracy and openness of Ukraine's political system, political processes in our country are governed by family-clan groupings through traditional norms adopted in society, rather than formal legislation [49, p. 16].

Ukrainian society hoped that V. Zelenskyi, who during the presidential campaign sharply criticized P. Poroshenko for his friends, god relatives, business partners, who «steered» politics and the economy of the state, would stop the practice of clan politics in all its manifestations. This could help to reduce the destructive influence of corrupt networks in power on the functioning of the state and society. However, winning the election, the newly elected president brought to power former partners in the «Quartal 95» studio and his childhood friends. These appointments are traced in the private, interpersonal relations of friendship and partnership, which is quite understandable, because these are friends, one can trust in, especially when you go

from the variety stage to the political stage. Moreover, the country lacks legal regulation of employment relations at the state, municipal and other services, as well as criteria for assessing the professionalism of a candidate for a certain position. That is why, Mr. Zelenskyi granted his «people» preferences by appointing them or, on the recommendation of certain persons, to high public positions with corresponding high salaries (for example, S. Sheriff was appointed First Assistant to the President, I. Bakanov – the Head of the Security Service of Ukraine, S. Trofimov and Y. Kostyuk – the Deputy Heads of the Presidential Administration, etc.). In doing so, Mr. President has broken all his promises as for the appointment of friends, god relatives and business partners.

By such actions V. Zelenskyi promoted the rooted functioning of informal destructive institutions in the sphere of public administration (political cronyism, clientism, patronage, nepotism, etc.) functioning in our country, as components of corruption, which contributes to the clan-based and behind-the-scenes decision-making at the state level in the interest of only a small group of people who are connected by friends or family relations. The officials' ineffective decisions, such as raising their salaries against the background of all the troubles in the country and impoverishing the most of the population is a confirmation of keeping the corruption component in power. Such actions by the authorities have repeatedly provoked conflicts in the socio-political and administrative spheres of society, which has negatively affected the anti-corruption reputation of both V. Zelenskyi and his party members and appointees to various high-ranking government positions and increased public distrust in the government.

Thus, the peculiarity of the started fight against corruption practice in the power in Ukraine in the current realities is that in the domestic socio-political space corruption has become a complex, systematic, multidimensional phenomenon and there has been institutionalization of numerous forms of corruption into informal destructive institutions with the destructive consequences on the life of a man, society and the state. The inconsistent and contradictory personnel policy of the current President and his closest environment cemented the practice of clan politics in all its manifestations, keeping the state structures as the source base of the clan-oligarchic system of Ukraine.

Another feature of the anti-corruption struggle in the domestic socio-political space is that it does not have sufficient support from the vast majority of the population due to the fact that the level of political and legal culture of society does not correspond to the achieved level of formal democracy. While citizens condemn high-level corruption, there is low resistance to corruption in the public consciousness, and corruption behaviors and actions left outside the formal procedures are justified, as corruption has become a social norm. The government failed to establish cooperation with civil society on preventing and combating corruption in Ukraine, participation of citizens in public administration, as well as supervision over the transparency of

funding of political entities remain minimal. The control by the state and the public over the official behavior of the politicum regarding the use of corruption practices by the officials in the form of various forms of corruption is formal.

**Conclusions.** In today's socio-political realities, rapid positive developments in the fight against corruption in government are unlikely to be expected, since all state structures and bodies are the main carriers of this destructive phenomenon, a source of its support and spreading through the network of corruption links and relations in the spheres of life in the country (political, law enforcement, judicial, financial and economic, scientific, educational, medical, cultural and informational, etc.), in each of which powerful clans were formed, which seems unrealistic to destroy them.

At the same time, the society does not lose hope for active anti-corruption measures by the state, which should control the activity of the state apparatus and respond promptly to any corruption manifestations. Moreover, for this activity there is a domestic anti-corruption legal framework, a draft Anti-corruption strategy for 2019–2023, experience in successfully combating corruption in European countries, scientific developments on mechanisms for preventing and combating corruption. The most active members of civil society are objectively interested in contributing, together with anti-corruption agencies, public associations and the media, to eradicating corruption in all spheres of public life, to change the public's perceptions of corrupt acts and justification of corruption practice, to promote the establishment of a public atmosphere of complete rejection of corruption and its recognition as a socially dangerous and destructive phenomenon for the individual, society and the state. Therefore, in the current socio-political realities, in order to counteract corruption in Ukraine, it is necessary to move from the permanent attempts to fight corruption to full-scale systemic measures in order to achieve this goal.

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## **ОСОБЕННОСТИ БОРЬБЫ С КОРРУПЦИЕЙ ВО ВЛАСТИ УКРАИНЫ В УСЛОВИЯХ СОВРЕМЕННЫХ СОЦИАЛЬНО- ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИХ РЕАЛИЙ**

*В статье подчеркивается, что в Украине за годы независимости коррупция превратилась в многоаспектное системное явление с разрушительными послед-*

ствями, що обумовило інституціоналізцію корупційних отношеиий, образо-  
ваніе неформальних деструктивних інститутів, котріе продлили практику  
клановості в політичеської та інших друіих сферах жізніедеятельності обществ,  
жівуучего по двоійним стандартам. Автор аналізуе та дае оцєнку некоторым  
антикорупційным мероприятіям, проведенным властью в последнее время та де-  
лае вывод об их имітаційным характере.

**Ключевые слова:** корупція, корупційна практика, антикорупційні механі-  
зми, дискреційна власть, неформальні деструктивні інститути політики.

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## ОСОБЛИВОСТІ БОРОТЬБИ З КОРУПЦІЄЮ У ВЛАДІ УКРАЇНИ В УМОВАХ СУЧАСНИХ СОЦІАЛЬНО-ПОЛІТИЧНИХ РЕАЛІЙ

**Постановка проблеми.** Антикорупційні заходи, розпочаті державними органа-  
ми влади напередодні новорічних свят з 2019 на 2020 р. викликали в населення Укра-  
їни хвилю обурення, посилили напруженість та конфліктність у суспільстві, нега-  
тивно вплинули на антикорупційну репутацію інститутів державного управління.  
Користуючись аномальністю «дозвільних» та регулюючих функцій, влада вчинила  
дії, які виглядають як чергова профанація, що закріпило проблему певної невідповід-  
ності між декларуванням державними службовцями та посадовцями своїх намірів  
і реальним станом речей щодо боротьби із корупцією. Тому питання подолання  
корупції у владі не втрачають своєї актуальності в умовах сучасних соціально-по-  
літичних реалій.

**Аналіз останніх досліджень та публікацій** свідчить про те, що питання запо-  
бігання та протидії корупції в органах державної влади не припиняють викликати  
живий інтерес як у зарубіжних (І. Амундсен, П. Бардхан, Е. М. Барр, А. В. Горовіц,  
М. Джонстон, В. Т. Левін, С. Роуз-Аккерман, С. С. Такер, А. Дж. Хайденхаймер,  
С. Гантінгтон та ін.), так і вітчизняних (І. В. Андрущенко, А. В. Боровик, А. В. Во-  
лошенко, В. С. Журавський, Д. В. Костенко, В. І. Литвиненко, М. І. Мельник,  
Є. В. Невмержиський, В. В. Нонік, О. В. Шкурпат, С. Б. Яковенко та ін.) фахівців,  
які присвятили свої роботи аналізу різних аспектів досліджуваної проблематики.  
Водночас недостатньо вивченою залишається низка ключових для антикорупційної  
діяльності питань, у тому числі таких, як особливості запобігання та протидії  
корупції у владі в умовах сучасних соціально-політичних реалій в Україні.

**Метою статті** є аналіз особливостей боротьби з корупцією у вітчизняному  
соціально-політичному просторі та пошук відповідних сучасним реаліям механізмів  
запобігання і протидії корупційним практикам у владі.

**Виклад основного матеріалу.** Корупція в Україні за роки незалежності перетворилася в багатоаспектне системне явище, яке фактично витіснило державу як імперативний (визначальний) суб'єкт влади, привласнюючи й деформуючи принципово важливі суспільні атрибути. Декларуючи свої наміри щодо боротьби з корупцією, Українська держава виконала або частково виконала за 2019 р. лише 6 з 12 рекомендацій, наданих Transparency International Ukraine, які б могли покращити показники нашої країни за Індексом сприйняття корупції (CPI), та посіла 126 місце зі 180, втративши свої позиції, порівняно з попереднім роком, на 2 бали. Це свідчить про імітаційний характер антикорупційної боротьби в нашій країні.

Спроби влади відновити довіру суспільства до держави та її представників через систему е-декларування майна та доходів можновладців не змінила ситуацію. Декларанти знаходять можливість декларувати мінімальну кількість майна, а Національне агентство з питань запобігання корупції займається хіба що дрібними питаннями, що доводить його функціональну неспроможність. Новообрані представники політичної еліти України лише консервують ситуацію, прикриваючись галасливою публічною антикорупційною риторикою та незрозумілими і неприйнятними в суспільстві інструментами боротьби з корупцією.

Корупція в Україні за роки незалежності перетворилася в багатоаспектне системне явище з руйнівними наслідками, що зумовило інституціоналізцію корупційних відносин, утворення неформальних деструктивних інститутів (непотизму, кумівства, кронізму, патрімоніалізму, кліснитизму тощо), які подовжили практику клановості в політичній та багатьох інших сферах життєдіяльності суспільства, яке живе за подвійними стандартами.

**Висновки.** Особливістю розпочатої боротьби з корупційною практикою у владі стало те, що попри певне зростання демократичності та відкритості політичної системи України політичні процеси в нашій країні, як і раніше, регулюють сімейно-кланові угруповання за допомогою традиційних норм, прийнятих у суспільстві, а не формального законодавства, залишаючи державні структури джерельною базою кланово-олігархічної системи України. Підтвердженням збереження корупційного складника у владі стало прийняття посадовцями неефективних рішень на кшталт підняття собі зарплат на фоні усіх негараздів у країні та зубожіння широких верств населення. Тому в умовах сучасних соціально-політичних реалій в країні для вирішення питань протидії корупції владі необхідно налагодити співпрацю з громадянським суспільством і незалежними засобами масової інформації та разом почати повномасштабні системні антикорупційні заходи задля досягнення поставленої мети, спираючись на вітчизняну нормативно-правову базу, конструктивні пропозиції науковців та світовий досвід країни, які мають позитивні результати в боротьбі з корупцією.

**Ключові слова:** корупція, корупційна практика, антикорупційні механізми, дискреційна влада, неформальні деструктивні інститути політики.

