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UDC 327:355.01

DOI 10.21564/2663-5704.53.258166

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MACROFLUCTUATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF GLOBAL TURBULENCE AND HYBRID WARS

This article carries out the phenomenological research of the «international system» through methodological synthesis. Features and various types of this system are critically organized. The transitive type and character of the modern global system of «disbalance and mutual equilibriums» fluctuating within the vectors of unipolarity and multipolarity in the conditions of competition of centers of global influence with different capacities (the

USA, the EU, China and Japan, the Russian Federation, the leaders of the Middle East) is substantiated. Article explores «geopolitical shifts» as factors that have created the global turbulence and macro fluctuations of the transitional international system. Hybrid wars became one of the most destabilizing factors of the contemporary international system, fostering its turbulence. The article proves that the hybrid war is a combination of the partisan and civil war, as well as rebellion and terrorism.

Keywords: *international system, global turbulence, geopolitical shifts, terrorism, hybrid wars.*

Problem setting. Notion of the «international system» is a foundation of the traditional, historical interpretation of the political setup of the world. It is used to refer to diplomatic and other relations between the states at certain stage of development of humankind. Consequently, each international system that used to or still exists, was presented as informal institutionalization of the alignment of forces and national interests of the states in respective space-time context. For example, using the «historical-panoramic» approach, scholars have defined the followings systems: international European system of the 17th century, based on principles of the Westphalian peace treaty of 1648; the «Concert of Europe» – system of political balance of states in the 19th century; global bipolar system of the states of the world in 1945–1990 etc. Yet the traditional paradigm has a significant drawback: it is not looking for principles of development of international systems and is mainly limited to description of the political or economic interaction between the main actors – large states [1, p. 158–159].

Actualization of contemporary scholarly research of the problem of macro fluctuations of the international system arises from the necessity to prove the existence of the systemic principles in international relations and global politics; with justification of the unavoidable influence of mega-tendencies (political-economic, humanitarian, technological, military etc) in conditions of the postmodernity, that lead to transformations of global world order [2]. The main advantage of the systemic approach is the possibility to uncover the logical connections between the character of the existing international system and actions of its main subjects; search for the causal connections between the stability/instability of the political system of the world and functioning of the interstate relations. This allows to consider *international system* more profoundly as super complicated analytical object, that depicts specific connections between real social communities organized by states and other actors, interaction between which has obvious (even if minimal) signs of the systemic organization.

Recent research and publications analysis. In the doctrinal plane of political science and international relations, the systematic approach to social and state constructs first gained fruitful development in the middle of the XX century in

works of D. Easton [3–4], M. Kaplan [5], T. Parsons (1991) [6]. It became quite important for understanding of the essence and parameters of the international system, where constantly interacting occurrences/phenomena, processes, events and situations are always determined by numerous factors and reasons; therefore systemic whole is always different (in quantitative and qualitative sense) from its constitutive elements. According to Hoffman, idea of systems, beyond any doubt, provides the most productive conceptual foundation. It allows to make a clear delineation between the theory of international relations and theory of foreign affairs, and also contributes to the successful development of both of them [7]. Yet, without denying the merits of Eaton's theory, experts are rather reserved when evaluating its capacity to analyze international systems. Its limitations are determined by Eaton's definition of the politics as «authoritarian division of the values», which does not take into account the specificity of the international relations that should not be interpreted only as political [8]. That is why it is difficult to apply Eaton's methods to the evaluation of the global international system, because its peculiar structure, as we know, lacks the authoritarian 'pyramid of the power', and horizontal relations do not remind the formula «demands ↔ solutions, actions».

Historical, political-legal, sociological, empirical, and syncretic paradigms used for study of the international systems and relations are most developed. Regardless of the specificity of different academic schools and certain differences within positions, they have accumulated quite productive results.

Founder of the historical-sociological approach Raymond Aron bases his analysis of the international system and relations on specific historical experience, but refutes any attempts to construct abstract models. Comparing relations between Greek poleis, European monarchies and republics of 17–18 centuries, characteristics of the interaction of the contemporary systems of East and West, he wanted to find sustainable repetitions, which would form general consistent patterns that confirm historical past and present. Raymond Aron concluded that precisely systemic approach allows to showcase the level of the social determinism that exists in current international relations. He noted that «analysis of the typical international system does not allow to foresee diplomatic event or dictate to the rulers the line of behavior that corresponds to the type of the system [9, p. 103]. In particular, bipolar system has tendencies to instability, because it is based on mutual lack of trust and fear, pushes sides of the standoff towards the brutality in attitude towards each other, that stems from the opposition of their interests.

Evan Luard made a special contribution to the sphere of the sociology of the international relations, by proposing a complex approach based on the thorough empirical material, collected by historians, sociologists, political scientists. Based on the conceptual (interchangeable) criteria – ideology, elites, motivations, means of actions used by actors, stratification, structure, norms, roles and institutions, – he

singled out and analyzed seven international systems in the history of the humankind: ancient Chinese system (771–721 BCE); system of the Ancient Greek states (510–338 BCE); international system of the era of the European dynasties (1300–1559 CE); system of the era of the religious rule (1559–1648 CE); system of the period of development and flourishing of the state sovereignty (1648–1789 CE); system of era of nationalism (1789–1914 CE); system of the era of rule of ideology (1914–1974 CE) (Luard 1976) [10]. By establishing factors that served as criteria, Luard pioneered factor analysis that investigated correlational action of this factors on the structure and functioning of the international systems, their evolution in historical space and time.

Methodological synthesis of historical-sociological and heuristic approaches allowed professor Richard Rosecrance to conduct syncretic analysis of the international systems. Based on the specificity of the epochal historical events, he establishes nine kinds of the international systems, that sequentially formed in the world in periods: 1740–1789, 1789–1814, 1814–1822, 1822–1848, 1848–1871, 1871–1888, 1888–1918, 1918–1945 and 1945–1960. Rosecrance conducted complex analysis of the international relations of each of these historical epochs with the aim of establishing factors (politics, wars, revolutions and so on) that contributed to stability of the international system or, on the contrary, contributed to its destabilization [11].

Morton Kaplan conducted the most consistent heuristic evaluation of the «international system» [5]. First of all, he was convinced that in order to analyze international system one has to establish circumstances that make its existence or transformation into another kind possible. For this reason he formulates the following profound questions: Why this or that system is developing? How are they functioning? Why they come to decline? Consequently, the scholar proposes a concept (fitting into paradigm of political realism, that is based on the idea of «balance of forces») that starting with 18th century global systems were formed in the world, that, while changing, provided for the main quality – ultra-stability of the international relations. He was the first to establish five exchangeable criteria, typical of each international system: 1) main rules of the system; 2) rules of transformation of the system; 3) rules of classification of the subject actors; 4) evaluation of their abilities and 5) of awareness. These general «rules of transformation» were supposed to explain laws of change of system.

Finally, of course empirical approach plays important role in the study of the international systems. It correlates with geopolitical specificity, and mainly investigates contemporary interaction of peoples and states, geopolitical strategies and tactics of governments within certain geographical regions [12–16]. Empirical research is characterized by: desire to specifically explain certain international situation (political, economic, humanitarian), that developed in certain region of

the planet, specificity of the systemic connections between global actors; to highlight the level of influence on behavior of the international subjects and decisions of national elites of following factors: socio-humanitarian and economic realities, national potential of the states, cross-regional competition, directions of actions and juridical boundaries regarding interventions of international organizations etc. Serious destructive influence on the contemporary system of international relations is exerted by new wars of the 21st century: wars on terror, cyberwar, hybrid wars and so on [17–26].

Paper objective. The main *aim* of this article is to establish by means of systemic, phenomenological and factor-geopolitical analysis the character of the contemporary international system and the nature of real and hybrid 'drivers' that stimulate its development and, at the same time, global turbulence.

Consequently, *research goals* are: 1/ to conduct a phenomenology of the international system using essential characteristics and ontological parameters; 2/ to systematize different typologies of the international systems; 3/ to establish the key tendencies of the evolution of the new world order; 4/ to establish and substantiate the most important factors of the global turbulence that determine 'geopolitical shifts' and macro fluctuations of the contemporary international system; 5/ to analyze the phenomenon of the hybrid war and discover its quintessence.

Paper main body. Contemporary conceptualization of the *international systems*, in our opinion, demands more accurate phenomenological interpretation, since this is a phenomenon of a special type.

First of all, international system is a *mega-phenomenon* of the social type, which organizes the existence of macro communities of planet in a special, relational way. Secondly, international systems are *supercomplex* in their content and structure, therefore they have to adapt each other and to elements of the whole environment (this is characteristic of the whole planetary system and of its regional and subregional subsystems). Thirdly, according to Phillippe Braillard *informal* and *poorly organized* nature of the international systems is obvious, because it is not always possible to delineate clearly and definitely between the complex that is being studied and its external environment [27]. Fourth of all, international system has capacity of *open formation*, which explains the low level of integration, even some divergence of components inside of the wholeness.

Consequently, this allows us to establish the most essential features characteristic of the international system:

– this is a system of *social interaction of the people*, who governs their actions by will, consciousness, interests, certain identity, values and other orientations. In this format, the content of the international relations as system-forming force, is an interaction of various participants – peoples, states, nations, world leaders, other social communities and organizations;

– *stable system of interstate relations* is, undoubtedly, the nucleus of the global international system, since international relations are mainly political and intergovernmental. But each country, integrated in the system, is not entirely free from conflicting perspectives, that can push the international order towards anarchy, or cause *global disintegration*;

– *spatial borders* of the international and regional systems (contrary to biological or technological) have *conditional character*. But, conditionality of these borders is not a «research construct», because international systems are an objective reality;

– international system is characterized by the *low level of the external and internal centralization*, because so-called «plurality of sovereignties» (absence of the supreme power) is a specific feature of the interstate relations. This provides for *politico-economic autonomy* of elements of the international system, that are only indirectly marked as certain unity;

– yet, we should not overemphasize the autonomy of the states in the international system: their cooperation stems not from the simple competition, but from the necessity of the «*balance of interests*», *mutually beneficial cooperation* (economic, political, humanitarian etc), interaction of traditional and new international actors.

Thus, we get a new definition: «contemporary international system» is an objective global reality that results from the acceptance by the sovereign states on the international arena of certain civilizational, politico-legal and socio-economic «status quo» on the planetary, regional or subregional level.

Analytical studies of international systems have led to the development of their typologies based on different criteria that should be systematized.

Classification that is most well-known among scholars was created in the paradigm of political realism. It divides international systems into balanced, imperial, bipolar and multipolar. In a *balanced* system («balance of forces») several large states maintain more or less equal influence on the evolution of events in the world for lengthy periods of time. They also mutually restrain each other from excessive claims to the rule. In the international system of the *imperial type* one superpower rules. It significantly surpasses the rest of the states by its total strength (size of territory, military force, economic potential, reserves of the natural resources and so on). As a result, it dictates main trends of the global development. Two most powerful states or their political blocs rule in *bipolar* international system. Thus, the global system until 1990s was characterized by two conflict lines that divided West and East on one hand (ideological, political, military-strategic rivalry), and North and South on the other hand (developed and economically backward countries). Finally, if a number of other states on earth can gradually achieve the capacities and strength of influence that would be

comparable to two leading states, then international system will inevitably transform into *multipolar* one [28, p. 187–188].

Paradigm of relationalism considers relatively independent, *functional* international systems of economic, political, military-strategic and humanitarian interaction – in fact, these are varieties of stable interstate relations. Scholars consider regional aspects of interaction the global states (both group and bilateral) as *structural levels* of international system. This approach defines place and ranking of actors in general system of international relations. Regional aspects of interaction of global states/states of the world (group and bilateral) scholars considers as structural levels of international system. This approach not only defines the place and ranking of actors in system of international relations; using the cultural-civilizational, structural and behavioral parameters it differentiates *regional* and *subregional* international systems as a method of «production of policies» and implementation of political decisions [29]. C. F. Andrian defined four basic types of such systems: folk, bureaucratic-authoritarian, elitist mobilization, and reconciliation. *Folk* (tribal) systems are stateless social communities, where social distance between rulers and ruled is miserably small; their regional localization has character of enclave (for instance, indigenous peoples of Australia and Oceania, tribes living in Africa or amazonian selves of Brazil). In *bureaucratic-authoritarian* system state carries out strict control over the social groups; material interest, moral and political values are very distanced; traditionalism and clericalism play significant role. These systems are mainly characteristic for states situated in subregions of continental Asia and Middle East. In *elitist mobilization* system (that dominated Asian geopolitical region of XX century) state does not differentiate between aims and material interests (industrialization, electrification, wars) from ideological values; rational secular aims are mythologized by political means. *Reconciliation* system is a pluralistic model of democratic states, which served as a blueprint for geopolitical unions and regional subsystems (the European Union, USA, Canada, Australia, Israel, contemporary Japan, India, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore etc). State power is controlled by society and has limited influence on social groups; leaders are open and reachable; differentiation of interests and moral-political values is mirrored in full secularization of politics, legal and structural separation of the church from the state.

In the activity paradigm (depending on the purpose of the analysis), researchers have divided the international systems into *stable* or *unstable* (or revolutionary, according to Stanley Hoffman). *Conflict* and *cooperative*, *open* and *closed* varieties of international systems are also substantiated. In the contemporary world not so many societies exist with homogeneous politico-cultural identity, where social conflicts are minimized. Arend Liiphart points out that regardless of geopolitical factors even systems of Western representative democracy should be divided into ones based *majority vote* and *consensus* (reconciliation) [30].

Morton Kaplan has heuristically created his multi-elemental typology of international systems (real global and hypothetical). Conceptualizing the first global system of «*balance of forces*» that existed since the XVIII century until the Second World War, he determined the rules of optimal actions of its actors: there should be at least five great powers in the system for it not to become bipolar; they should increase their power potential, but if possible, prefer negotiations, not military actions; it is better to stop a real war than to destroy a great power (which means losing the main subject); to prevent individual states or coalitions seeking to seize a dominant position in the international system; to restrain actors applying supranational principles of organization and behavior; to allow losers or weakened key actors to take a new place in the international system as partners; to help secondary actors to increase their status.

The second real global system is the «*free bipolar*» (loosely connected) that appeared after the Second World War. Its bipolarity was restrained by the UN actions and by the force of neutral actors. He explained the maintenance of the stability of this system by the following rules: both blocs seek to strengthen their capabilities in comparison with each other; it is better to fight than to allow the opposite bloc to occupy the dominant position in the system; subdue the goals of universal actors to the general purpose, and the goals of the enemy bloc – to the goal of universal actors; strive for the quantitative expansion of one's bloc, but to remain tolerant towards non-aligned countries. Consequently, the bipolar system, according to Kaplan, is more dangerous because it is characterized by the aspiration of the parties to global expansion, by constant struggle between the blocs for a global redistribution of the world, for the preservation of their positions.

Later, this scholar a priori highlighted the system of «*unit veto*», or a multi-polar system, where the number of actors with the ability to block a crisis of system by means of a nuclear deterrence (or sometimes by resorting to blackmail) increases. The next type is the «*flexible bipolar system*», where actors-states and new entities – unions and blocs of states, and universal actors (international organizations) – coexist. According to the structural configuration, this system is rather non-hierarchical and the strategy of the blocs is consistently formed by the sovereign states. A strongly hierarchical and in general authoritarian «*rigid bipolar system*» can also appear, where universal actors are limited in their ability to influence the blocs; the will of the head of the bloc's coalition is imposed on the allies; non-allied and neutral states that existed in the soft bipolar system disappear. Kaplan analyzes the «*international hierarchical system*», which in essence, can be considered a «world power»; in its structure, national countries will gradually refuse or lose their sovereignty, becoming ordinary territorial units; but the centrifugal tendencies on their part will be strictly suppressed. Finally, the researcher foresees a «*universal international system*» of a confederal type, with a high political homogeneity of

the international environment based on the solidarity of nation-states and the key influence of the universal actor. This international system requires well-developed integration in the political, economic, administrative and managerial sectors; adoption of consolidated decisions about the formation of strategies, tactics and application of cumulative force [5]. The broad powers within it belong to a universal actor – an international organization that has the right to determine the status of states and allocate resources to them, is responsible for complying with international norms (this is close to the role of the United Nations, which would have exclusive competences for conflict resolution and peacekeeping).

In the ideal sense, this last type of international system (where the construct of rigid bipolarity disappears) would be the most desirable prospect of the development of a modern globalized world, especially after the collapse of «socialist camp» that was ideologically and politically hostile with the West in 1980–1990. However, the reality is much more complicated. In the modernized world system of the 20-21st centuries a developed civil society already exists, along with a «culture of participation» of citizens in politics, political roles and functions are differentiated according to the structure of political institutions; consequently, a post-rational way of justifying power has emerged, and the world's elites are resorting to new ways of global competition [31–35].

This prompts us to rethink the essence of new trends and processes in the planetary system of the 21st century in the paradigm of factor-geopolitical analysis. On the one hand, the law of «balance of forces», of balance of international systems suggests the chances of relative stability of the global system of the world in different historical epochs [9, p. 144]. But as for systemic transformations, they are determined by the law of «correlation between polarization and stability» of the international system. Hence, the logic of modern development shows that the planetary system fluctuates within the vectors of *unipolarity* and *multipolarity* in the conditions of competition of *centers of global influence* of different capacities: the USA, European Union, China and Japan, Russia, leader states of the Middle East. Consequently, it is hypothetically possible to determine the *transitional* type of the international system in a state of «*disbalance and mutual equilibriums*», which is still being formed, yet, at the same time, contains the rudiments of the old system and elements of the modernized world order.

The international system of modernity began to experience radically modern changes under the influence of the powerful «*geopolitical landslides*» (factors of influence), which caused its turbulence and further transformation: 1) the completion of the collapse of colonial empires and the emergence of many post-colonial countries as independent international actors on the political map of the world, implementing their national-political projects; 2) the global collapse of the model of the «bipolar world» – of closed political systems, which embodied two

superpowers of Soviet Union and the United States; the end of the «Cold War»; loss of meaning of the paradigm of the «Third World» for the underdeveloped countries; 3) entrance of new sovereign states into the world arena (after the collapse of the USSR, Yugoslavia, etc.), which are modernizing and introducing their new own geostrategies in international relations; 4) post-communist transformation of the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, Asia and Africa fundamentally changed the ideological balances and geopolitical design of the planet. As a result, the strategic shift of the Baltic-Mediterranean arc into a new geopolitical trajectory took place – into the Baltic-Black Sea arc, along the borders of Russia with the Baltic States, Ukraine, and Georgia; 5) the global economic jump of Southeast Asia as a subregional system, driven by the success of the quasi-superpowers of the region: Japan (economic strength and investments), China (demographic and industrial capacities), South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong (technology); India (leader of social democracy). According to Phillippe Braillard and Mohammad-Reza Djalili, this results from the existence of regional subsystems – a set of specific interactions based on general geographic affiliation [36]; 6) the geopolitical «weight» of the South Asian subregion grows because of the collapse of the North Korea's «nuclear blackmail» militaristic strategy, thanks to the successes of diplomacy of the US President Donald Trump; 7) paradoxically, but currently the political-economic competition between strategic partners – the USA and the European Union – is intensifying. At the same time, military-political tensions between the Russian Federation and the United States and NATO, as global rivals in various geopolitical aspects – war in Syria, sanctions against the Russian Federation because of the annexation of Crimea and aggression in eastern Ukraine – are growing; global migration; Iranian, Iraqi and Venezuelan issues, etc.

Turbulent character and macro fluctuations of transitional international system of «disbalance and mutual equilibriums», additionally is determined by the competitive coexistence of states of stable and transitional democracy, autocratic states (that can be differentiated into traditional-conservative, military-totalitarian, authoritarian-modernized) and specific quasi-states. This combination of authoritarianism with liberal democracy is problematic, and leaves impact on the global politics – temporary restorations of the post-communist governments, lack of competent and responsible bureaucracy, corruption-related scandals in international structures, ignoring of the demands of the global states in questions relating to survival of humankind.

Wars still remain the most dangerous factor in destabilization of contemporary world system in the XXI century. Recent years saw the development of a form of armed conflict that starts with «peaceful» anti-government protests and end with brutal civil war and external intervention. This goes beyond the frames of the conventional thinking about wars. They acquire the combined character, turning

into the tangled knot of political intrigues, bitter fight for the resources and financial flows, irreconcilable civilizational confrontations. Here all possible methods are used, sides are using any, even most dangerous methods and actions – both violent and non-violent. Victims of conflict of this new type are peaceful citizens, first and foremost – the most vulnerable categories of population: elderly people, women and children. In circumstances of such warfare it becomes impossible to differentiate who is right and who is wrong, enemies from allies, simple civilians from fighters and suicide terrorists. Hidden or open external military intervention, carried out by gangs of militants from neighboring countries, supported by high-tech means of intelligence and destruction provided by some developed countries of the world, gives such an armed conflict even more confusing and ambiguous character. The purport of military operations in the war of this type is not the physical destruction of the enemy's armed forces, but demoralization and the imposition of one's own will on the population of the state. Many new actors appear on the battlefield along with regular troops in contemporary armed conflict – irregular rebel formations and militants, criminal gangs, international terrorist networks, private military-industrial companies and legions of foreign mercenaries, units of special forces from different countries of the world, as well as military contingents of international organizations. This new type of war has been called the «hybrid war» in the West.

The concept of hybrid war was first made public by General James N. Mattis in September 2005 at a defense conference hosted by the US Naval Intelligence Institute and the Marine Corps Association. Then this concept was published in article co-authored with Frank Hoffman in November 2005 in the article «Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars» [37]. Therefore, we can consider Frank G. Hoffman, the leading research fellow at the National Institute of Strategic Studies at the National University of Defense (USA), to be one of the founders of the concept of a «hybrid» war, described in a number of books and articles [38–45]. Hoffman believes that in the future we will be confronted not with a number of adversaries, each of whom will chooses just one, either non-traditional or another, way of confrontation, but with opponents who simultaneously combine all methods of confrontation that manifest themselves in the form of multimodal (mixed) or hybrid wars. The hybrid war is a combination of the deadly inter-state conflict with the fanaticism of the ever-smoldering partisan warfare [40, p. 38]. The concept of «hybrid» war relates both to their organization and to the means used during them. Organizationally they may have a hierarchical political structure, in combination with decentralized elements or networked tactical units. The means of confrontation they choose can also be hybrid in form and application. In this kind of conflict, according to Hoffman, future opponents (states, groups sponsored by the state, or self-financed groups) will have access to modern military capabilities, including cryptographic command systems, portable rocket systems and other modern lethal weapons. They can also provide

support for insurgent movements that use ambushes, homemade explosive devices, violence and murders. These can be the states that use a combination of high-tech equipment, such as anti-satellite weapons, with terrorism and cyber warfare against financial organizations. The conflicts will involve hybrid organizations such as Hizbollah and Hamas that use a whole variety of options. In addition, states can provide their regular armed forces with the status of irregular paramilitary forces and apply new tactics, as Fedayeen have done in Iraq in 2003.

In such conflicts, Hoffman writes, we will be confronted with large states that can use hidden and indirect means of attack. This form of confrontation will be characterized by insidiousness and cruelty, constant improvisation and large-scale organizational restructuring. Such a war will not be ordinary, low-intensity or short, it will be endless. Hybrid wars are polymorphic by nature and can be conducted both by states and non-state actors; they also include different ways of conducting wars [40, p. 36]. According to Hoffman, hybrid wars combine a number of different regimes of war conduct, including the use of traditional, non-standard (non-traditional) tactics and non-state (irregular) militarized formations, organization of terrorist attacks with use of the indiscriminate violence and coercion, as well as criminal disorder. Similar activities have many forms and can be carried out by different units or even by one unit, but are usually operatively and tactically managed in coordination with other units operating in the main theater of military operations to achieve synergy effect. Such effects can be achieved at any level of combat operations [39, p. 29]. «The success in the hybrid war requires action by small units, with determined and inventive commanders, ready to clash with the unknown – and who possess the appropriate weapons and equipment to outrun the enemy. Of course, the greatest problem in the future will be protection, especially given the diversity of weapons and the ways in which they are used», Hoffman emphasizes [40, p. 38]. The enemy also benefits from the modern information technologies, which allow to improve the training of militants and the exchange of experience. An example of such training could be seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, where militants quickly mastered tactical and technical innovations that they found on the Internet or received from other sources. Today, the boundaries between the «right» and the «wrong» war have become blurred. Even non-governmental organizations are increasingly gaining access to weapons that were previously only state-owned. And even governments are increasingly turning to non-traditional strategies [40, p. 39].

If we were to summarize what we have already mentioned about hybrid war, it is important to underline that, firstly, it combines conventional and non-conventional military operations and the corresponding participants of this war (terrorists, mercenaries, partisans, militias, banditry, special forces of other states, etc. become the actors along with the regular armed forces). Secondly, the beginning of the hybrid war involves the use of unconventional methods of military operations by

illegal armed formations. Thirdly, during the whole duration of the hybrid war, the struggle for the minds and souls of the people becomes very important, that is, the information struggle where the main actors are not military, but civilians: media, television, the Internet, and other means of mass communication.

In any case, armed forces are the most important participant in the war. Let's try to systematize schematically all the diversity of wars in the history of humankind through the prism of revolutions in art of war [46]. By revolution in art of war we mean the whole amount of radical changes in means of armed struggle, methods of conducting military operations, organization of troops, their education and training [47]. This approach allows us to present the entire history of the evolution of wars in the form of six generations of wars (see table).

Table

Evolution of wars

Comparable parameter	War of the first generation	War of the second generation	War of the third generation	War of the fourth generation	War of the fifth generation	War of the sixth generation
The main type of weapon	Cold weapon	Smooth-bore weapons	Rifled multi-charge weapon of high speed, accuracy and far range of shooting	Automatic and reactive weapons, mechanized troops, tanks, aircraft, aircraft carriers, submarines	Nuclear missiles	High-precision weapons, weapons created using new physical principles, information weapons, forces and means of radio electronic warfare
The main type of confrontation on land	Hand-to-hand combat	Frontal fight using fire guns	Trench warfare of joint military unions and associations	Operations on the fronts	Nuclear missile attack	Joint airborne ground operation
The main type of confrontation on sea	Boarding combat of the galley fleet in the coastal zone	Marine battles of the sailing fleet in the coastal seas	Naval battles of steam, metal ships of various classes	Marine operations	Nuclear missile attack	Joint air-ground maritime operation; aerospace naval operation

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Comparable parameter	War of the first generation	War of the second generation	War of the third generation	War of the fourth generation	War of the fifth generation	War of the sixth generation
The main type of confrontation in air				Air strikes on troops, air battles	Nuclear missile attack	Aerospace operation using conventional weapons
Scale of war	Tactical	Operational tactical	Operational strategic	Strategic	Strategic, global, threat of demise of civilization or separate continents	Operational strategic
Main aim	To destroy the enemy, take possession of their weapon and valuables	To destroy the enemy, take possession of their territory and valuables	The defeat of the enemy's armed forces, the destruction of their economy and capture of their territory	The defeat of the enemy's armed forces, the destruction of their economic potential, overthrow of the political system	No aims can be achieved here – the party that used the nuclear weapon perishes later	Undermining the economy, administration system, the vital functions of the state and the destruction of military facilities

In order to win in hybrid war, the armed forces should have modern aerospace forces, highly precise shock and defense weapons, weapons based on new physical principles, information weapons, forces and means of radio electronic warfare, and air defense [48, p. 148–149]. Their absence or weak development makes the country unable to protect its national interests and state sovereignty.

A number of other participants act on the battlefield of the hybrid war along with the armed forces. Let us focus on representatives of illegal armed formations of the hybrid war, first of all – on terrorists. Terrorism is, unfortunately, a very common and well established phenomenon in the modern world [49]. Terrorism is the most brutal violent act, aimed at creating the emotional state of fear (first of all, among the civilians), in order to achieve its goals. Terrorism is characterized by the scale, visibility, variety of means used during terrorist acts and the high

degree of social danger. As Brian Jenkins noted back in 1979 «a terrorist subculture can become a permanent feature of our world» [50, p. 39]. The terrorist subculture has entropic, ruinous character, both for the terrorist's personality and for any culture he represents, and for our planet as a whole, because destructiveness is the underlying foundation of this subculture. Those personal and social conditions that block the energy of support and development of life, contribute to transformation of this energy into destructive, which, in turn, is the source of evil. Terrorism is the terrible reality of the present. In our opinion, the most important components of the mode of being of terrorists are: a pronounced destructive axiosphere, authoritarianism, a sense of exclusivity, orientation towards the domination of group ethos, and «theatricality». The destructive axiosphere is based on the antinomic vision of the world and society («us vs. them»), inherent to majority of terrorists, which is manifested in extreme intolerance to any dissent, fluctuations and doubts. An important motive for resorting to terrorism is the excessive need to strengthen the personal identity, which is achieved by belonging to a group of terrorists. Interweaving of the idea of identity with the idea of serving a great purpose adds a special significance to identity. Since belonging to a group is one of the highest values, group norms are idealized, and receding self-consciousness and weakened «I» only contribute to the expansion of group consciousness. Society is vilified. Universal values are actively denied, especially the right of other people to live. Violence and aggression become values on their own. Violence and aggressiveness attract action-oriented, impulsive, mentally disharmonious people because they allow them to realize in the shortest time possible their own ideas of goodness and justice, «punish» those who prevent these ideas from being realized.

The terrorist activity fits in the scheme proposed by American sociologist Herbert Kelman. He established that violence is accompanied by three processes: 1) sanctioning; 2) routinization; 3) dehumanization [51]. These processes are based on the increasing weakening of moral responsibility for committed actions, absolute neglect of the rights and freedoms of other people, and of universal values. As historical practice confirms, as the unrealistic nature of «good intentions» becomes obvious, the means become more and more inhumane and cynical, and the goal is lost, disappears or transforms beyond recognition. Notorious maxim «everything that serves the cause can be morally justified» is not just a popular argument in favor of terrorism. Terrorism in all its manifestations directly follows from it. Both individual killings and mass extermination of people are based on this idea.

Criminals are important participants of the hybrid war. Terrorist organizations bring professional killers and people with a criminal past into their ranks. Even Sergey Nechaev proposed to reach out «to the brave world of bandits – the only true revolutionaries in Russia». Criminals find a nurturing environment in extremist

organizations. «Ideological» terrorists need them, since sometimes they are not able to carry out cold-hearted massacres of people on their own.

Mercenaries are inevitable participants of the hybrid warfare. The experience of the war in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan shows that today «regular armies» face ruthless mercenaries (a modern version of medieval Landsknechte), who do not even obey military orders if they do not like them. After carrying out a comparative analysis of typical features of a soldier and a mercenary, we can note the following. The soldier is characterized by willingness to make sacrifices, by discipline, organization, readiness to defeat other soldiers, he has a legal status and an intention to restore order, while a «new warrior» has a passion for profit, a weak discipline or the absence of any discipline, individualism, readiness for violence, even in relation to the civilians. His status is outlawed, and he aims at destroying the order. Therefore, we could consider «new warriors» to be similar to terrorists.

Militias, partisans, ie. representatives of the local population, who are actively involved in military actions, also are important participants in the hybrid warfare, along with the terrorists, mercenaries and representatives of special forces of other countries. We must realize that terrorists can not act on their own, they need some kind of support from the local population, since this is inherent in the nature of any social conflict. The most common scenario of the development of social conflict consists of three stages: on the initial stage the population is divided, social groups split into «us» and «strangers» according to some characteristic or set of features: national, regional, religious affiliation, political orientation, etc. Then, the opposing parties move to active action, expressed in spontaneous or organized rallies, increased clashes with law enforcement bodies. And finally, to begin directly violent actions (such as attack of an excited crowd on the building of the authorities and the administration, military objects, buildings of the law enforcement structures, in order to capture the weapons and release the arrested, etc.; committing pogroms, murder, rape, arson of houses and automobiles) both the mobilization of the crowd, and the presence of a provocative event, which gives rise to relevant actions are necessary.

Let us consider the figure of a partisan. Partisan is a member of the armed struggle on the territory seized by an enemy, who acts as a member of volunteer groups that rely on the support of the local population. Irregular partisan is a defender of the interests of the people, yet he also is a bandit for the opposing side, because he does not adhere to the rules of warfare. Ernesto Che Guevara represents the partisan as a man whose goal is to realize the aspiration of the people to freedom. After all peaceful means to achievement of this goal are exhausted, the partisan begins to fight, becomes an armed vanguard of the fighting people. The purpose of this struggle is to destruct unjust order. It is typical for guerrilla warfare that each of its members is ready to die, but not to die in the name of the defense of an ideal,

but to make this ideal a reality via one's own death. This is the foundation and essence of partisan struggle. This explains the miracle that a small detachment of people, armed avant-garde of the masses who support it, struggles decisively to destroy the old society and establish a new one, to achieve social justice [52].

Certain resemblance of the partisan movement to terrorism allowed a number of scholars to partly or completely equate these phenomena. Terrorism has become a fundamentally new factor that has been incorporated into the strategy of partisan warfare by militants from the Middle East. An important characteristic here is the «right» of the partisan terrorists to fight not only with the enemy soldier, but also with the civilian population – either the enemy's population or even one's own, if they are helping the enemy. This is a total war, built on the principles of partisan resistance [53]. However, there is also another point of view. American scholar of terrorism Paul Wilkinson notes that the main difference between the partisans and terrorists may be the damage to the civilians. In his work «Terrorism and the liberal state», scholar noted: «Partisans can fight in small numbers and often with insufficient weapons, but they can and often fight according to the rules of the traditional war, taking and exchanging prisoners and respecting the rights of the civilians. Terrorists do not distinguish between the means they use and often resort to widespread murders, spreading 'general terror' to local civilians» [54, p. 54]. While for guerrilla warfare as a specific method of warfare, sober calculation, weighed and comprehensive assessment of the situation, military expediency of future actions, clear and well thought out planning are always in the first place.

We can discern yet another subject of a «hybrid» war – a rebel. The rebels are essentially the same by forms and methods of action as partisans. The difference is that the partisans are fighting against the aggressor occupying the territory of their country, and the rebels – against their own government. Therefore, we can say that country's own special forces and parts of regular troops that found themselves in the enemy's rear because of the military fate participate in the partisan movement, while special forces of a foreign state interested in overthrowing the ruling regime participate in the rebel movement.

And last thing we want to consider, is an information warfare that is carried out continuously throughout the hybrid war. Moreover, it usually begins long before the first armed actions and is deliberately aimed at destroying the spiritual world of nations and peoples against whom it is being conducted. Jean Baudrillard's theory of simulacra [55] forms the basis of the contemporary information warfare. According to this theory, simulacra become increasingly detached from reproduction of the real, and eventually become completely autonomous, detached from reality that they originally represented. Depending on the historical period, Jean Baudrillard identified three categories of simulacra. The closer we get to the contemporary times, the more each of them are detached from examples of the real world. So, the

simulacra of the first order still indicate the original source; a baroque fake can serve as an example of this. The Industrial Revolution, with its mechanized production process prompted second-order simulacra, when mass produced series of analogous equivalent copies are created. Finally, the postmodern period created the third order of simulacra, which, due to the close connection with the means of communication and mass media, form simulated hyperreality that is more realistic than reality itself. In the postmodern age a large number of simulacra exists. They are the false signs, which, having separated from their prototypes, substitute the true meaning, thus creating a world completely different to the one in which people used to live. This world was created so swiftly that people turned out to be unprepared to meet with it. Thanks to the efforts of the experts in the information warfare, such simulacra as «banderivets», «Right sector», «Kyiv fascist junta», «terrorist», «separatist», «Novorosiya», «Donetsk People's Republic» etc. appear. And they are more frightening than real instances of violence or natural disasters that are experienced in reality. Any war, including hybrid one, will end at some point. Yet the information warfare for people's minds and hearts will never end, since we entered the information age, where information becomes the main source of wealth and well-being of the people. How it will reach people, what world they will create – either European, Russian, or some other – depends on every individual, on civil society and on the state.

Conclusions of the research. Contemporary international system is currently in a state of transitional from the unipolar world to polipolar one, from the stability that prevailed after the collapse of the world socialist system to the qualitatively new international system with several fulcrums. But this process is very complex and prolonged; it will be constantly influenced by the new «geopolitical shifts», as factors contributing to global turbulence and macro fluctuations of the transitional international system: the final collapse of the colonial system; the destruction of the model of the «bipolar world» and the emergence of sovereign states that implement their own geostrategies on a world arena; problems of coexistence of countries of stable and transitional democracy, autocracies and specific quasi-states; strategic shift of the Baltic-Black Sea arc to the borders of Russia with the Baltics, Ukraine, Georgia; the global economic jump of Southeast Asia as a subregional system; increase in economic competition of strategic partners – the USA and the European Union; an increase in military-political tension between the Russian Federation and the US and NATO, and so on.

The complex synergy of the aforementioned geopolitical factors at the moment does not provide an opportunity to overcome the hierarchical nature of the planetary system and to establish multipolar «balance of forces» that would guarantee the high stability, because its main condition is the «equilibrium of the capacities» of the actors. We should not also forget that regardless of the relative unity, international

system has certain destructions and geopolitical enclaves, conditioned by the excesses of the relations, national paradoxes etc. In particular, multipolar system has its own risks, such as proliferation of the nuclear arms, unforeseen consequences of the change of configuration of the union of the large states, emergence of conflicts between small actors or increase of the risks of international crime and hybrid wars.

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МАКРОКОЛИВАННЯ МІЖНАРОДНОЇ СИСТЕМИ ПІД ВПЛИВОМ ГЛОБАЛЬНОЇ ТУРБУЛЕНТНОСТІ ТА ГІБРИДНИХ ВІЙН

У статті шляхом методологічного синтезу здійснено феноменологію «міжнародної системи», критично впорядковано її ознаки та різноманітні типи. Обґрунтовано як транзитивний тип і характер сучасної планетарної системи «дисбалансу та взаємних урівноважень», що коливається в межах векторів однополярності та мультиполярності за умов конкуренції центрів глобального впливу різної потужності: США, Євросоюзу, Китаю та Японії, РФ, країн-лідерів Близького Сходу. Досліджуються «геополітичні зсуви» як чинники, що зумовили глобальну турбулентність і макроколивання перехідної міжнародної системи: остаточний крах колоніальної системи; руйнування моделі «двополюсного світу» і вихід на світову арену суверенних держав, які запроваджують власні геостратегії; проблеми співіснування країн сталої і транзитивної демократії, автократій та специфічних квазідержав; стратегічний зсув Балто-Чорноморської дуги до кордонів Росії з Балтією, Україною, Грузією; глобальний економічний ривок Південно-Східної Азії як субрегіональної системи; посилення економічної конкуренції стратегічних партнерів – США та Євросоюзу; зростання військово-політичної напруги між РФ та США і НАТО тощо. Одним із найбільш дестабілізуючих чинників сучасної міжнародної системи, що сприяє її турбулентності, виступають гібридні війни. Обґрунтовано, що гібридна війна – це комбінація партизанської та громадянської воєн, а також заволодіння територією. Надано характеристику основних учасників гібридної війни: армії, терористів, партизанів, повстанців тощо, а також особливості притаманних їм бойових дій.

Ключові слова: міжнародна система, глобальна турбулентність, геополітичні зсуви, тероризм, гібридні війни.

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МАКРОКОЛЕБАНИЯ МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЙ СИСТЕМЫ ПОД ВЛИЯНИЕМ ГЛОБАЛЬНОЙ ТУРБУЛЕНТНОСТИ И ГИБРИДНЫХ ВОЙН

В статье путем методологического синтеза осуществлена феноменология «международной системы», критически упорядочены ее признаки и различные типы. Обосновывается как транзитивный тип и характер современной планетарной системы «дисбаланса и взаимных уравниваний», которая колеблется в пределах векторов однополярности и мультиполярности в условиях конкуренции центров глобального влияния разной силы: США, Евросоюза, Китая и Японии, РФ, стран-лидеров Ближнего Востока. Исследуются «геополитические смещения» как факторы, обусловившие глобальную турбулентность и макроколебания переходной международной системы: окончательный крах колониальной системы; разрушение модели «двухполюсного мира» и выход на мировую арену суверенных государств, вводящих собственные геостратегии; проблемы сосуществования стран устойчивой и транзитивной демократии, автократий и специфических квазигосударств; стратегическое смещение Балто-Черноморской дуги к границам России с Балтией, Украиной, Грузией; глобальный экономический рывок Юго-Восточной Азии как субрегиональной системы; усиление экономической конкуренции стратегических партнеров – США и Евросоюза; рост военно-политического напряжения между РФ и США и НАТО. Одним из наиболее дестабилизирующих факторов современной международной системы, способствующей ее турбулентности, выступают гибридные войны. Обосновано, что гибридная война – это комбинация партизанской и гражданской войн, а также мятежа и терроризма. Дана характеристика основных участников гибридной войны: армии, террористов, партизан, повстанцев и т. д., а также особенности присущих им боевых действий.

Ключевые слова: международная система, глобальная турбулентность, геополитические сдвиги, терроризм, гибридные войны.

